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The U.S. Congress has significantly curtailed its lawmaking activities in recent 
years, and many commentators, scholars, and legislators themselves point to a decline in 
the institution’s output. Two trends blur this focus. First, the number of substantive (non-
commemorative) laws enacted by Congress did not significantly decline until very 
recently. Second, that the roots of this decline have been growing for several decades, in 
the committee system. Data from 1981 to 2012 show that congressional committees have 
significantly shifted their activity towards oversight and other non-legislative 
policymaking at the expense of advancing legislation. Congressional committees act as 
Congress’s agenda setting capacity by determining what issues the institution can and will 
address and how it does so. Any explanation for a decline in congressional lawmaking, 
therefore, must begin with committees. I develop a theory of committee policymaking in 
this dissertation based on the limited agenda space decisionmakers face. Making policy 
through legislative or non-legislative means involves opportunity costs, and committees 
face uncertainty about whether their legislative work will bear fruit. With this theory as a 
guide, I test three explanations for the longitudinal shift in committee activity away from 
legislation. While current and former members of Congress, commentators, and other 
observers blame political gridlock and an expanding executive branch, I find that changes 
 vii 
made to the legislative process itself have altered the incentives for committees to compete 
for agenda space and make policy through legislation. Members of both parties have 
centralized agenda setting responsibilities under party leaders over the last three decades, 
which has altered the contours and availability of legislative authority. My findings have 
important implications for Congress’s role in the policy process and how scholars and 
citizens evaluate the institution, including the importance of committee incentives and 
capacity for congressional agenda setting. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The U.S. Congress has struggled in recent years to enact laws at the same rate it 
once did, often coming under criticism for its lack of legislative productivity. Legislators, 
journalists, and other observers have bestowed the title “do-nothing Congress” to the last 
three congressional terms, while D.C. newspaper The Hill has called the most recent 
congress “historically unproductive” (Marcos and Cox 2014). Looking beyond even counts 
of enacted laws, evidence of congressional struggles to complete even previously-
noncontroversial legislative work abounds, from the obvious (a 2012 government 
shutdown) to the relatively obscure (reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank). 
 Calling a Congress “unproductive” because it enacts relatively fewer laws 
discounts many of the institution's responsibilities and activities; one cannot confine a 
legislature's role exclusively to lawmaking (Jewell and Patterson 1966). Congress also 
takes responsibility for overseeing executive branch actions, and much of the institution's 
work today is non-legislative. This chapter considers the recent sentiment that 
congressional lawmaking has declined and finds little evidence for a decrease in the 
number of substantive laws enacted over the last several decades. Instead, committees have 
shifted their activity towards oversight and other forms of non-legislative policymaking. 
Rather than a completely unproductive Congress across its range of possible activities, 
instead we have seen a shift in how the institution devotes its resources. This change is 
particularly felt among committees, which are marking up and reporting fewer bills and 
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devoting more of their hearing activity to oversight. Explaining a decline in congressional 
lawmaking requires explaining changes to committee policymaking over the past 35 years. 
“PRODUCTIVITY,” PUBLIC LAWS, AND COMMITTEES 
 Do-nothing Congress. Unproductive. Gridlock. Logjam. Congress punts. All of 
these phrases should be familiar to even casual observers of American politics in recent 
years. The U.S. Congress has faced myriad criticism from both current and former 
members, journalists and commentators, political scientists, and citizens for its seeming 
inability to come together as an institution and enact laws that solve the nation's public 
problems. Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) represents the prevailing sentiment when he 
says, “This place has to start working again...I'm sick and tired of going home and 
explaining why we're not passing anything” (Marcos and Cox 2014). 
 Practitioners and academics alike use terms like “productivity” and 
“accomplishment” to characterize Congress's output based on how many laws it enacts 
(Clinton and Lapinski 2006; Eldridge 2014). A more productive Congress, as Murphy and 
other critics would have it, is one that enacts more laws. Congress is enacting fewer laws 
today than it once did, so the argument goes, Congress is therefore unproductive. We have 
a few reasons to doubt the connection between congressional “productivity” and a count 
of enacted laws. First, not every problem requires legislative action to solve it. Second, 
each law enacted may contain dozens of individual provisions that each “accomplish” 
something. The combined continuing resolution-omnibus appropriations law enacted at the 
end of the 113th Congress, for example, addressed financial regulations, federal election 
 3 
campaign contribution limits, school lunches, military benefits, immigration, and a NASA 
mission to Jupiter, among other provisions (Eldridge 2014). 
We have yet another reason to doubt claims that Congress has become 
“unproductive” because it is enacting fewer laws, one that illustrates the need for a 
broader view of the legislative process and congressional policymaking. Prior studies of 
lawmaking have relied on different measures to tell their stories, with a common focus on 
“major” or “important” laws but disagreement as to which laws qualify (Binder 2003; 
Clinton and Lapinski 2006; Howell, et al. 2000; Mayhew 1991). Despite the 
disagreement over which laws are more important, we should at least be able to agree on 
which laws are relatively less important—commemorative laws, for example, that re-
name federal buildings or designate July as National Ice Cream Month. These data belie 
the notion that Congress today is enacting only “post office bills.” In fact, Congress is 
enacting almost anything else. Former House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) pushed 
back against complaints of a do-nothing Congress on his watch, saying that “We made 
clear when we took over that we weren't going to be doing commemorative legislation on 
the floor” (Fuller 2013). Not only did Boehner follow through on his claim, but in doing 
so he followed many of his predecessors. The overall decrease in enacted laws seen since 
the 1980s is due almost entirely to a decrease in commemorative legislation (see Figure 
1-1). By at least one measure, Congress is no less productive or accomplished today than 




Figure 1-1. Laws Enacted by the U.S. Congress, 1981-2014 
 
Source: Policy Agendas Project, calculated by the author. These data end at the 113th Congress, the last 
congress for which the Policy Agendas Project has complete data. 
 
Accusations of an unproductive Congress based on enacted laws may be misguided, 
but clearly something about congressional lawmaking has changed. Recent years have been 
replete with examples of breakdowns in the authorizations process, the loss of the “regular 
order” in appropriations, and federal agencies struggling to fulfill their duties in the face of 
congressional inaction. In order to better understand the why, we first need a better handle 
on the what. I argue that in order to understand changes to congressional lawmaking, we 
need to look to the committee system. I make this argument for two reasons. First, the 
legislative process encompasses more than its endpoint.1 Lawmaking studies tend to focus 
                                                 
1 Or to anticipate my subsequent discussion, just one of its possible endpoints. 
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on the final two or three steps and leave out committees, even though the latter are 
traditionally considered “Congress at work” (Wilson [1885] 1956). Committees largely 
remain “Congress at work” even as party leaders have taken a larger policymaking role. 
 The second reason for focusing on committees to explain changes to congressional 
lawmaking follows from the first: lawmaking requires agenda setting, and Congress's 
agenda setting capacity lies within its committee system. For political institutions like the 
U.S. Congress, translating inputs into outputs requires transforming individual decisions 
into collective decisions (B. Jones 2001). The committee system plays a large role in doing 
so due to its function as a specialized division of labor.2 
“In all institutions,” Sinclair (1981, 397) writes, “information is a vital precondition 
to influence.” James Madison and his co-authors recognized information's importance to 
                                                 
2 The agenda setting process is, at least in part, “the decision about which decision to consider” (Bauer, et 
al. 1963, 405). Research on agenda setting tends to fall within one of two traditions: one based in formal 
theory that focuses on voting agendas, and one based in the policy process that focuses on issue 
agendas. Each tradition is rooted in the same basic question: how do decision-makers come to pay 
attention to some things (such as policy issues or voting alternatives) and not others, and what are the 
consequences of this attention—and the ability to shape such attention—on decisions and ultimately 
outputs. 
The policy process approach to agenda setting looks at issue agendas: the set of subjects to which different 
actors (the public, a group of elites, an institution) are paying attention (Cobb and Elder 1983; Cobb, et 
al. 1977; Light 1991; Walker 1977). Agenda setters in this conception work to define the parameters of 
debate by defining what constitutes a problem the government should (or should not) address. The 
positive political theory approach studies how different voting rules and institutional arrangements 
produce certain outcomes, specifically either shifts away from or reinforcements to the status quo 
policy. Agendas in this context represent a choice or sequence of choices presented to some group of 
voters, which in turn influence how those voters decide. Many legislative scholars working in this 
tradition focus on restrictive debate rules and agreements as incentives for committees to engage in 
different types of behavior (Cox 2000; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Levine and Plott 1977; Romer and 
Rosenthal 1978). 
This dissertation represents an attempt to bridge the two research traditions of agenda setting. A decision 
about which proposal to take up (the voting agenda) also decides which issue to pay attention to (the 
policy agenda). In advancing (or not advancing) legislation, committees engage in both types of agenda 
setting at the same time. They define not only the universe of potential solutions the legislature might 
adopt but also the universe of policy problems to which the legislature as a whole might pay attention. 
Lengthier discussions on this point can be found in this chapter and in chapter 2. 
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congressional activity in the Federalist. Arguing against annual House elections in 
Federalist 53, Publius (Madison) writes, “no man can be a competent legislator who does 
not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the 
subject on which he is to legislate.” Regarding commerce, taxation, and military affairs, 
Madison continues, 
These are the principal objects of federal legislation and suggest most 
forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought to 
require. The other inferior objects will require a proportional degree of 
information with regard to them. (Publius [1788] 1987, 328-9). 
 
The Senate, as Madison writes in Federalist 72 and 73, provides a “due acquaintance with 
the objects and principles of legislation” and sustained attention to complex policies that 
might require more than the House's two-year window to address (Publius [1788] 1987, 
366). Lawmaking requires information, and the two chambers of Congress were designed 
to allow legislators to learn about policy—to gather information—in ways that supplement 
the knowledge they receive or bring with them from their districts. 
Members of Congress find themselves awash in information of largely two different 
types: policy and political information (Kingdon 1984). “Policy” information refers to that 
which legislators might receive about what is or is not a problem in need of addressing, the 
likely outcome of a particular policy proposal (including its costs and benefits and their 
timing) or any other technical detail. Policy information primarily is used to develop 
legislation, decide how to vote on a particular proposal, persuade other actors to one's 
position or provide a post hoc justification for a policy decision. Even if technical 
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information does not directly inform policy decisions, it often influences policymakers' 
vocabularies and modes of thinking (Wu 2008). 
“Political” information includes the location and intensity of other actors' policy 
preferences, the relative values placed on party labels and on executive branch funding 
requests, a member or group's beliefs about their appropriate organizational role and cues 
about who legislators should turn to for voting recommendations. Political information 
often acts as signals between political actors and assists in making voting decisions 
(Austen-Smith and Riker 1987; Kingdon 1973; Krehbiel 1991; Rich 2004). As an example, 
policy or substantive information would include what hydraulic fracture drilling 
(“fracking”) entails on a technical level while political information on that same issue 
would encompass which colleagues face constituent pressure to support or oppose the 
process. 
 Just as devoting attention to an issue carries information about what an actor thinks 
the government should pay attention to, an institution's voting agenda carries with it 
information about the proposers' preferences (Austen-Smith and Riker 1987; Cox 2001; 
Romer and Rosenthal 1978). As an agenda setter determines which proposal is matched up 
against the status quo or the sequence of amendments to be considered, she thus directs 
voters' attention towards, and away from, different information. Floor action on omnibus 
agriculture legislation (the “farm bill”) in 2012 illustrates this dynamic in action. The bill 
was repeatedly delayed on the House floor that year even through Congress had routinely 
enacted previous iterations by wide voting margins. The Senate passed its version in June 
2012, followed soon thereafter by House Agriculture Committee approval, but House 
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committee member Tim Huelskamp (R-Kan.) raised objections to the bill's nutrition 
assistance program funding authorization. Republican leaders repeatedly delayed floor 
action to avoid potential conservative amendments that would force their caucus to cast 
tough votes on nutrition assistance program funding. Not only would those amendments 
have carried information about their sponsors' policy preferences, they would have directed 
the House's attention to a different issue or policy dimension as well. 
From an information processing perspective, an organization's division of labor 
helps break down the number of decisions that must be made into smaller components and 
filters the decisions that require higher levels of attention (Simon 1976). The committee 
system can simultaneously process multiple flows of information about problems and 
solutions at once and adapt to changes in those information flows, which expands 
Congress's plenary agenda (Adler and Wilkerson 2012; Cooper 1970; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005; Kingdon 1984; McConachie 1898). Committees act as Congress’s 
agenda setting capacity for both problems (what issues the institution should address) and 
solutions (how it should address those problems). They do so by processing and prioritizing 
the different substantive and political information vying for congressional attention. The 
term “information processing” is used throughout the study of organizations to refer to the 
means by which organizations acquire, synthesize, distribute, and use information (Cyert 
and March 1963; Egelhoff 1991; Huber 1991; Ottati and Wyer 1990; Tushman and Nadler 
1978). It the organizational analogue to individual information processing which is itself, 
as Simon and Newell (1964) characterize it, transforming inputs to outputs.  
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Committees today have two primary means of setting the congressional agenda—
that is, of processing and prioritizing information. They can pursue legislation and hold 
oversight hearings (or engage in similar forms of non-legislative policymaking). Much of 
Congress's work is expected to be legislative (Galloway 1953); as Woodrow Wilson put it 
in Congressional Government ([1885] 1956, 193), “Congress always makes what haste it 
can to legislate... Be the matters small or great, frivolous or grave, which busy it, its aim is 
to have laws always a-making.” Congress's role over time grew to encompass oversight of 
a growing executive branch, and so we can't fully characterize the legislature's task 
exclusively in lawmaking terms (Jewell and Patterson 1966). In fact, data on legislative 
activity across committees reveal shifts in policymaking that cast further doubt on the idea 
of a totally unproductive contemporary institution. If we want to understand the decline in 
congressional legislating over the past several decades, we thus need to understand it as a 
shift among committees away from legislative activity rather than a falloff in enacted laws. 
 I examine two types of legislative activity: holding referral hearings and marking 
up bills. The former occur when a bill is introduced and referred to a committee, and are 
important signals of a committee's intentions about whether it will work to advance the 
bill. They are opportunities to educate members about a proposal and begin to build a 
supporting coalition (Galloway 1953; Jewell and Patterson 1966; Rieselbach 1973). In 
short, referral hearings “lay an intellectual and political foundation for legislation” (Kaiser 
2013, 27). 
 The second type of legislative activity, marking up and reporting bills out of 
committee, is where committees decide whether to amend a bill or send it to the floor as 
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is. Markups allow committee members to offer amendments and soften up the agenda for 
future action. Committees take in information through bill referrals and congressional 
hearings, and the legislation they approve and send to the House floor represents 
information about the relationship between policy proposals and likely outcomes (Krehbiel 
1991). Markups, where committee members vote on whether to amend a bill and approve 
it for further consideration, are thus where committees apply the information they have 
learned and construct their legislative outputs, where they become “Congress at work” 
(Wilson [1885] 1956). As Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) put it, “a committee markup 
actually causes members to understand what's in a bill” (Kaiser 2013, 262-3). 
 When we look at committee hearing activity, we see that the number of legislative 
hearings has declined precipitously while the number of oversight (or non-legislative) 
hearings has held relatively steady. When committees are holding hearings, then, those 
hearings are less likely to be legislative today than they were 35 years ago (see Figure 1-
2). Committees in both chambers devoted about three out of every ten hearings on average 
to learning about and building support for referred bills throughout the 1980s up until about 
the 102nd Congress (1991-1992), though we see legislative hearings begin to trend 
downward even earlier in the House during the 99th Congress (1985-1986). More recently 
we see that House committees on average have held just over one out of every ten hearings 
on average on referred bills since the 109th Congress (2005-2006), and Senate committees 




Figure 1-2. Committee Hearing Trends, 1981-2012 
Panel A: Counts by Type 
 
Panel B: Proportions by Type 
 
 
Source: Policy Agendas Project Congressional Hearings dataset, which did not include hearings from the 
112th Congress as of this writing; calculated by the author. 
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The markup data echo the hearings data, but also highlight an interesting difference 
between the chambers: Senate committees, on average, mark up and report out a much 
higher proportion of referred bills than do their House counterparts (see Figure 1-3). No 
doubt this difference is due in large part to the lower number of bills introduced in the 
upper chamber, but it also challengers our understanding that legislative action is more 
“peripheral” to Senate life (Polsby 1971). The drop in average markup activity also has 
been more dramatic in the upper chamber than in the House. Senate committees marked 
up and reported out about one out of every three referred bills on average in the early 1980s, 
while that number has dropped to about two markups for every 10 referred bills on average 
in the early 2000s and one markup for every ten bills in the 112th Congress (2011-2). House 
committees, for their part, are marking up and reporting out referred bills today at about 
half the rate they did in the 1980s: just over one marked-up bill for every 10 referred bills 
in the 97th and 98th Congresses (1981-4), and just over one marked-up bill for every 20 
referred bills in the 111th and 112th Congresses (2009-12), on average. 
Taken together, data on committee activity from 1981 to 2012 reinforce the notion 
that Congress as an institution largely has shifted its focus away from legislating and 
toward other activities. Congressional committees are holding relatively fewer legislative 
referral hearings in favor of conducting oversight over the past several decades. While the 
data in Figure 1-3 do not necessarily show the same kind of explicit shift from legislative 
to non-legislative activity, they present clear evidence that committee legislative activity 
has, on the whole, declined since 1981. 
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Figure 1-3. Bills Reported Out of Committee, 1981-2012. 
 
Source: THOMAS, calculated by the author. 
 
 The hearings and markup trends both stand in contrast to Figure 1-1, where a 
decline in substantive, non-commemorative lawmaking was harder to discern until very 
recently. Furthermore, the decline in committee legislating precedes any decline in 
substantive lawmaking output by decades. To the extent that we would like to understand 
a recent decline in congressional legislative activity, we really need to understand why 




PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
In this dissertation I develop a theory of how committees decide how to make 
policy—through legislation or oversight—to explain the shift in committee activity we 
have seen over the past 35 years. Committees are meso-level organizations within 
Congress, and as such they have two main goals: helping their individual members achieve 
their goals (whatever those might be) and gaining or retaining policymaking authority. This 
authority allows committees to decide for themselves which issues to address and how to 
address them. Making policy through either legislation or oversight incurs opportunity 
costs; time, attention, and other resources that cannot simultaneously be devoted to other 
activities. In order to offset these opportunity costs, committees pursue whichever 
policymaking activities will contribute to their authority and thus their goals. 
I find that legislating has become a less attractive prospect for committees over 
time. The main source of this decline is the centralization of different agenda setting 
procedures under party leaders in both the House and Senate, which in turn alter the 
contours and availability of legislative authority for committees. Additionally, the 
executive branch has grown in size and scope since World War II, which ensures a steady 
demand for congressional attention to agency activity. As legislative authority has shifted 
towards party leaders and agencies seek answers for how to set priorities among their many 
programs, committees are finding it more fruitful—or at least more likely to offset their 
opportunity costs—to use their hearings to define issues and compete for bureaucratic 
attention. I further find that one culprit often named by members of Congress and 
commentators, partisanship, has not played a direct role in the decline of committee 
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legislating. Rather, as the parties have become stronger and more cohesive, the party 
leaders have been given more tools to structure the agenda, which in turn has altered 
committee decisions about how to make policy. 
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the two 
committee goals and the uncertainty and opportunity cost concepts and lays out the 
conditions under which we should expect committees to legislate and when we should 
expect to see more oversight. Chapter 3 examines whether chamber-level partisanship 
contributes to committee uncertainty about gaining legislative authority, and finds little 
support for partisanship and gridlock directly contributing to the decline of committee 
lawmaking. Chapter 4, by contrast, finds that committees are spending more time on 
oversight as they are less likely to see gains from legislating, particularly as a centralized 
agenda setting process has shifted authority towards party leaders. Chapter 5 considers the 
expansion of executive branch policymaking, and finds that increased committee oversight 
has resulted not only from a more active bureaucracy but also from congressional action 
itself as the institution has provided agencies with fewer directions over budgeting and 
spending. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the dissertation’s findings and their 
implications for Congress’s role within the U.S. policy process, for how political scientists 
study Congress and its agenda, and for how citizens evaluate the legislative branch. 
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Chapter 2: Committees and Congress in the Policy Process 
The U.S. Congress plays a fundamental agenda-setting role within the U.S. political 
system: processing and prioritizing information for government action. As a representative 
body, members try to reflect public concerns and address issues that their local and national 
constituents find important while also maintaining critical government functions. Congress 
and its committees act as policy venues for interest groups, and the other branches of 
government often look to the legislature for guidance, agreement, or simply for attention. 
By its structure and operations, Congress can determine what issues both it and other 
governmental actors pay attention to and how they address those issues. 
In the previous chapter I showed that a decline in congressional lawmaking has not 
really happened on the chamber floor but rather in the committee room. Committees are 
“Congress at work,” and increasingly the work being done is prioritizing policy problems 
and overseeing executive branch activity. The shift towards oversight has important 
implications for Congress as a policymaking institution, it’s relationships to other branches 
of government, and representation. This dissertation tests several explanations for the shift 
in committee policymaking away from legislating. Before doing so, we need to better 
understand Congress’s role in the policy process and how committees help Congress fulfill 
that role. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section introduces two important 
committee goals in making policy: helping individual members and policymaking 
authority. The second section describes how attention and agenda space are limited, which 
creates opportunity costs for committees and competition for policymaking authority, and 
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discusses how this competition influences committee decisions between legislation and 
oversight. Whereas the previous chapter showed aggregate trends in committee 
policymaking, in this section I present individual committee-level data on legislative 
activity from 1981 to 2012. The final section concludes with several potential explanations 
for shifts in committee competition and policymaking to be tested in the ensuing chapters. 
COMMITTEE GOALS AND HOW TO ACHIEVE THEM 
The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee pursued a 
classic “softening up” strategy in the 111th and 112th Congresses as it worked toward a 
legislative response to the issue of vulnerable online data and infrastructure; a 2010 hearing 
helped define the problem and featured testimony supportive of the committee leaders' 
approach to the issue, while a hearing two years later saw members of Congress, current 
and former Homeland Security secretaries, and representatives from think tanks and 
corporations offer their opinions on the latest iteration of the committee's bill (U.S. 
Congress 2010; 2012). The committee was unsuccessful in seeing its bill pass the Senate,3 
and so the committee took a different approach the following congress. Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs held two hearings on cybersecurity in the 113th Congress, both 
of which aimed at “strengthening” (really directing) public-private partnerships between 
Homeland Security, Commerce, and other executive branch agencies and internet security 
firms to address the issue absent the force of law (U.S. Congress 2013; 2014).4 
                                                 
3 The bill made it to the floor in July 2012, but cloture was not invoked by a 51-46 vote and the bill died at 
the congress's end. 
4 President Obama issued an executive order on cybersecurity in February 2013, which required the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology director to establish a baseline framework for reducing 
risks to infrastructure, and the hearings addressed this executive order in part. The committee still had the 
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The Senate Government Affairs Committee's story is not unique. As we saw in 
chapter 1, committees throughout Congress have shifted much of their activity over the last 
35 years away from legislation and towards oversight and other non-legislative enterprises. 
Fiorina (1986) argues that choosing between administrative and judicially-enforced 
regulation entails choosing between less certain and more certain oversight methods. 
Fiorina's argument can be extended to a committee's decision to pursue legislation or 
oversight: a less-certain versus more-certain means of making policy. To understand why, 
the rest of this chapter discusses how the two forms of policymaking help committees 
achieve their goals, which means we also must briefly discuss what those goals entail.  
 Committees are, of course, made up of individuals each with her own goals and 
motivations for taking various action within a legislature, goals which include winning re-
election for herself and majority party status for her party, making “good” (or preventing 
“bad”) policy, and advancing her political career beyond the role in which she serves either 
by advancing internally or moving on to some other institution (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 
1974; Rohde 1979; Rohde and Aldrich 2010). Richard Fenno's (1973) pathbreaking 
analysis helped identify committees whose members predominantly held one of these 
goals, and congressional scholars often speak of “power committees” or “re-election 
committees” as a shorthand to help identify and predict differences in committee action 
(Sinclair 1986; Smith and Deering 1990). Yet Fenno (1973, 79) also finds that, “no two 
committees, it appears, will produce the same set of guiding premises” due to the complex 
                                                 
option of pursuing legislation to codify or modify the president's action, but did not do so (the committee's 
previous bills, for example, placed coordinating authority under the Homeland Security Department). 
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relationship between committee members' different motivations, the committees' 
environmental constraints, and their standardized procedural responses to same. Fenno's 
work echoes that of Herbert Simon (1964, 20), who argues that for organizations:  
It is doubtful whether decisions are generally directed toward achieving a 
goal. It is easier, and clearer, to view decisions as being concerned with 
discovering courses of action that satisfy a whole set of constraints. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
 
Speaking of an “organizational goal” tends to refer to constraints on that organization's 
role, particularly that of its leaders (Simon 1964). With this distinction in mind I identify 
two key committee goals as they act as Congress's agenda-setting capacity that are 
necessary to understand the shift away from legislative activity seen in figure 1-2. 
 The first relevant “organizational goal” that a committee holds is to help its 
individual members achieve their goals, whatever those may be. For our purposes here, it 
matters little whether committee members are primarily interested in winning re-election, 
making “good” policy, gaining institutional influence, or something else entirely. Both 
legislative and non-legislative activity can help members achieve their different goals, 
though they do so in different ways as will be discussed shortly. 
 Whatever goals a committee member might pursue, the second relevant committee 
goal is decision-making authority. Authority within an organization is the right to choose 
actions that affect that organization in whole or in part (Simon 1951). A committee's 
decision-making authority refers to its ability to make policy decisions for itself. This 
second goal reinforces the first: a committee needs some degree of decision-making 
authority in order to provide its individual members with opportunities to pursue their own 
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ends. Positing authority as a goal does not imply that committees value agenda space 
equally, nor even that they always want the issues they represent to reach Congress's formal 
agenda; strategic inaction can be just as important as action in committee competition for 
issue jurisdiction (King 1997). Decision-making authority refers to a committee's ability to 
make that determination–to decide between action and inaction, and among different types 
of action–within the chamber in which it operates. 
 I also distinguish committee decision-making authority from autonomy and 
influence, which Fenno (1973) identifies as important committee motivations. For Fenno 
and others, committee autonomy is the ability to have a greater independent influence on 
policy decisions relative to other groups, particularly the executive branch, while influence 
is a committee's ability to have its decisions supported on the floor. I assume the less-
restrictive goal of authority over autonomy because a lack of independence does not 
necessarily hinder a committee's ability to satisfy its individual members' goals. 
Committees set up oversight “fire alarms” precisely so they can more efficiently allocate 
their attention and other resources (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Committee members 
still may help constituents and make policy even if the committee begins paying attention 
to an issue based on a “pulled” fire alarm from interest groups or the bureaucracy, rather 
than decide to pay attention to that issue independently. I also assume that committees 
desire authority rather than the more-restrictive “influence” for reasons that I hope will 
soon become clear. With the two committee goals in mind, helping their individual 
members and decision-making authority, I now turn to how they influence committee 
competition for information and agenda space. 
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CALL ON ME: COMMITTEE COMPETITION FOR AGENDA SPACE AND AUTHORITY 
 All organizations, like Congress, face limits on their available attention (Workman, 
et al. 2009). Committees thus must compete with each other for that attention—that is, for 
agenda space. Just as agenda setting—processing and prioritizing information for action—
has both a problem and a solution dimension, so too might committees compete for 
information and agenda space over issues and proposals. Committees have two primary 
means of prioritizing information: holding hearings and pursuing legislation. As we will 
see, one reinforces the other, such that the prospect of specifically legislative authority 
often drives committee competition. 
 Committees compete with one another in several ways when holding hearings. 
First, committees engage in “turf wars” as they attempt to gather information and define 
problems in such a way that enhances their decision-making authority (King 1997; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993). For issues already under a committee's jurisdiction, non-
legislative hearings keep policy within a given subsystem network of committee, interest 
groups, agencies, and other relevant actors. Subsystems represent stability and once 
established, they restrict participation from other actors, which in turn helps a committee 
retain its decision-making authority (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Bawn 1997; Worsham 
2006). Second, non-legislative hearings may help a committee expand its decision-making 
authority by identifying new policy problems and redefining old issues that may exist in 
other committees' jurisdictions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; King 1994; Talbert, et al. 
1995). Finally, oversight hearings create competition among committees to define and 
direct bureaucratic attention towards different problems and solutions and for the 
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information and expertise that bureaucrats provide (Aberbach 1990; Foreman 1988; 
McCubbins and Schwartz 1985; May, et al. 2008). 
Legislative action creates competition among committees because doing so elevates 
an issue out of subsystem politics and potentially mobilizes additional interests, and 
because the chamber floor is organized precisely to winnow the number of demands on 
congressional time and attention (C. Jones 1982; Krutz 2005). Committees face several 
complications when competing with one another for scarce floor space; floor action is not 
assured once the bill is reported out. As Adler and Wilkerson (2012) show in constructing 
their problem-solving model, the chamber's dominant strategy is to not allocate floor time 
for a committee's bill. In addition to the limited agenda space available for proposals, 
ideological or partisan rifts within a chamber may keep a bill from being scheduled. Non-
legislative action allows committees to better retain and expand their decision-making 
authority but provides mostly minimal, short-term gains, while legislation potentially 
countermobilizes new interests against committee authority and creates more uncertainty 
for committees as they directly compete with one another for legislative authority with 
limits on available floor space for their bills. 
The decision to pursue policy through legislation or oversight is critical because 
doing so—in either case—imposes opportunity costs on committees (Bawn 1997). 
Wildavsky (1979, 160) notes that, “any decision involving the use of resources has a cost 
– the ability to use those resources in another capacity.” Devoting time, attention, and other 
resources to legislation removes the ability to put those resources towards oversight, and 
vice versa (Bawn 1997; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). So, too, does devoting time and 
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attention to one issue or small set of issues prevent other issues from being considered (B. 
Jones 2001; Walker 1977). Committees thus must balance trying to lock in policy authority 
through legislative effort with the uncertainty of whether a bill will be taken up on the floor 
and the opportunity costs of foregoing more certain, but more limited, non-legislative 
action. As they balance their legislative and non-legislative work, committees must 
anticipate both other panels' decisions about how they make policy and the party leaders' 
decisions about what the larger institution will prioritize. 
 Non-legislative action benefits committees in several ways. First, members can 
devote attention to issues that help advance their own personal mix of goals. Oversight 
hearings allow a committee and its members to respond to pressing or otherwise salient 
problems and claim credit for having done so (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Even as a 
freshman, former senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), acting through the Judiciary Committee, 
was able to hold repeated non-legislative hearings to direct bureaucrats' attention to his 
preferred issues (Fenno 1991). Interacting with bureaucrats allows expertise to filter up 
through the policy process and help members of Congress learn about policy consequences 
and become recognized as influential experts in their own right (Adler and Wilkerson 2008; 
Baron 2000; Elmore 1979; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; May, et al 2008). 
 Non-legislative action also contributes to committee decision-making authority. 
Making policy through non-legislative action keeps policy within a given subsystem 
network of committee, interest groups, agencies, and other relevant actors. Subsystems 
represent stability and negative policy feedback; once established, they restrict 
participation from other actors, which in turn helps a committee retain its decision-making 
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authority (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Bawn 1997; Worsham 2006). Non-legislative 
activity also may help a committee expand its authority by identifying new policy problems 
and redefining old issues that may exist in other committees' jurisdictions (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993; King 1994; Talbert, et al. 1995). 
 Given the stability, authority, and credit-claiming and learning opportunities that 
non-legislative action helps create, why devote the time, effort, and other resources to 
writing legislation? This question is not merely rhetorical; just as non-legislative action 
helps maintain subsystem stability, making policy through legislation elevates the visibility 
and scope of conflict around a given issue. Indeed, Wolfe (2012) finds that media coverage 
tends to “hit the brakes” on lawmaking as new interests countermobilize. 
 Legislative activity helps committees achieve their goals in different ways. First, 
legislative action tends to be more visible than all but the highest-profile oversight hearings 
and, while this fact poses some danger to committees, it also provides members with more 
concrete actions for which to claim credit (Adler and Wilkerson 2012). Legislating also 
helps committees achieve or retain decision-making authority and locks in this authority 
for a longer period of time than non-legislative action. Legislation typically sets policy for 
multiple years at a time, ensuring that a committee will have the authority not only to 
review that policy as it is implemented but to revise it in the future. At the risk of being 
facile, legislative policymaking also confers legislative authority. Legislative authority, in 
turn, gives a committee some degree of gatekeeping power and a greater say in how they 
may allocate their own resources, both between action and inaction and among different 
types of action, in the future. 
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 While chapter 1 showed declines in the average legislative activity across 
committees, breaking these data out by individual committee shows some variation across 
panels, which in turn points to shifts in committee competition for legislative authority 
over time. Comparing legislative activity across committees can illustrate which 
committees have emphasized competition for legislative agenda space more than others 
over the past several decades. Committees that held few hearings in a given congress from 
1981 to 2012, like the two rules committees and the House District of Columbia 
Committee, led the way in focusing their hearing activity on legislation during this time 
period (Figure 2-1). The House and Senate committees with jurisdiction over judiciary, 
energy, and resources issues devoted at least one out of every three hearings to legislation 
on average from 1981 to 2012. Looking at the opposite end, we see that the two budget 
committees held relatively fewer referral hearings in each chamber during this period. The 
data also show some interesting cross-chamber variation for some committees with similar 
jurisdictions. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, has the lowest 
average referral hearing ratio in its chamber over this time period, while the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee devoted relatively more of its hearings to legislation (though still in the 






Figure 2-1. Committee Referral Hearing Ratio Averages, 1981-2012 
 
 
Source: Policy Agendas Project, calculated by the author. 
 
The bills reported averages (Figure 2-2) show many similarities to the hearings 
data. Several of the same committees are at the top of the list, including the two resources 
committees, the House District of Columbia and Merchant Marines Committees, and the 
Senate Indian Affairs Committee. The two tax committees, House Ways and Means and 
Senate Finance, are near the bottom in average bills reported to the floor. In part this finding 
is due to the substantial number of bills referred to the committee, which increases the 
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denominator in the ratio measure. Tax bills also typically are dealt with in a comprehensive 
way rather than piecemeal, so one bill reported out by either committee covers many 
programs. Finally, Congress repeatedly has taken steps to prevent other committees from 
encroaching on the two tax committees' turf, so neither may feel compelled to compete for 
legislative authority in the same way as other committees. 




Source: THOMAS, calculated by the author. 
 28 
 Committees are roughly organized around different sets of related issues, and so 
the data in Figures 2-1 and 2-2 represent cross-sections of the congressional policy agenda 
over the past 35 years. Resources and environmental issues have represented relatively 
more of the institution's legislative activity since 1981, while military, foreign affairs, and 
banking issues have tended to characterize Congress's non-legislative agenda. 
Tracing changes within committees across time reveals that most committees in 
both chambers show relatively consistent downward trends in legislative hearings—that is, 
the vast majority of committees are devoting relatively more of their hearing activity to 
oversight today than they did 35 years ago (see Figures 2-3 and 2-4). For some committees 
this change has been gradual, as with the House Education and Labor, Energy and 
Commerce, and Transportation Committees and Senate Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation and Energy and Natural Resources Committees. Other committees 
experienced relatively sudden, dramatic shifts; the House Appropriations and Senate 
Appropriations, Armed Services, and Judiciary Committees saw sharp drop-offs in 
legislative hearings in the mid-1980s. 
We see similar trends for committee markups; increasingly fewer committees over 
time are competing with one another for floor space and legislative authority. In the House 
(Figure 2-5), committees such as Armed Services, Education and Labor, and Energy and 
Commerce show relatively steady declines over this period, while others like Agriculture 
and Ways and Means show sharp declines in legislative activity. A few committees have, 
in fact, increased their legislative hearing activity over the past 35 years, notably the two 
government operations and oversight committees and the House Banking and Budget 
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committees. Several Senate committees, such as Environment and Public Works and Indian 
Affairs have held their legislative output relatively steady (see figure 2-6). 
Figure 2-3. House Committee Legislative Hearing Trends, 1981-2012 
 
Source: Policy Agendas Project, calculated by the author. 
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Figure 2-4. Senate Committee Legislative Hearing Trends, 1981-2010 
 






Figure 2-5. House Committee Bills Reported Trends, 1981-2012 
 






Figure 2-6. Senate Committee Bills Reported Trends, 1981-2012 
 
Source: THOMAS, calculated by the author. 
 
What explains the trends seen in Figures 2-3 through 2-6? Why are fewer and fewer 
committees in both chambers competing with one another for legislative information and 
agenda space? Based on this chapter’s discussion, two factors should drive committee 
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decisions between legislation and oversight when making policy. First, uncertainty about 
whether a committee’s bills will reach the legislative agenda now and in the future and thus 
offsett the opportunity costs associated with devoting time to legislative activity. Second, 
and relatedly, a belief that oversight will help a committee gain or retain policymaking 
authority to a greater extent than will legislative work. The next section develops these 
hypotheses further based on a series of institutional changes that have affected how 
legislative and non-legislative action help committees achieve their goals. 
TESTING EXPLANATIONS FOR A DECLINE IN LEGISLATING 
 Political scientists and other observers have studied lawmaking from a variety of 
perspectives and reach different conclusions about what drives legislative activity. Their 
studies, reports, and articles largely focus on the two chambers' floor agendas. As we have 
seen in this and the previous chapter, any explanation for the recent decline in 
congressional legislative activity should incorporate committee decisions between 
legislation and oversight. I conclude this chapter by briefly considering several potential 
explanations for the shift away from legislative activity. 
Legislating involves more uncertainty for committees than does oversight of the 
executive branch. When a committee holds an oversight hearing, it knows that it is 
conducting oversight. When a committee holds a hearing on a bill or reports that bill to the 
floor, obstacles remain that may prevent that bill from being considered in the full chamber 
(just ask Joe Lieberman). One possible explanation for a decline in committee legislating 
thus may be that uncertainty about obtaining floor space has increased. Such uncertainty 
can have several sources, but one is frequently highlighted by scholars, journalists, and 
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legislators: partisanship. Congress tends to enact smaller shares of its agenda under divided 
government, while increased polarization—parties that are ideologically homogeneous 
internally yet unlike one another—tends to decrease the likelihood that a given significant 
legislative proposal will be enacted (Binder 2003; D. Jones 2001). As lawmaking becomes 
harder, the uncertainty surrounding which bills will reach the floor agenda increases. Just 
as the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee experienced with cybersecurity, a 
committee can spend weeks, months, even years developing a particular bill only to see the 
final product fall due to political gridlock, time that could have been spent redefining the 
problem in a more favorable way or directing bureaucratic implementation. The 
uncertainty explanation is explored in more detail in chapter 3. 
Another possible explanation is that competition for policymaking authority has 
changed to make oversight more fruitful for committees than legislating. Specifically, party 
leaders are playing larger roles in establishing the lines of legislative authority at the 
beginning of the process through referring bills to committees, and towards the end of the 
process through determining which bills come up for debate on the floor. According to this 
explanation, partisanship still “matters,” but indirectly. As the two parties have become 
more homogenous and more willing to give party leaders greater authority, less of that 
authority is available to committees and in turn they are spending their time on other things. 
Chapter 4 takes up this explanation. The distinction between direct and indirect partisan 
effects is an important one for understanding the sources of changes to congressional 
policymaking and thus the potential solutions for those who would wish to see committees 
spend more time legislating.  
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The previous two explanations address committee legislative incentives and 
uncertainty. But what of committees’ other option? A third explanation for the shift 
towards greater committee oversight is that demand for such policymaking has increased; 
committees are spending more time on oversight because they must. Chapter 5 takes up 
this explanation by examining two sources of increased oversight demand: the growth in 
executive branch policymaking following World War II; and an increasing reliance on 
temporary, stopgap government funding measures called continuing resolutions that create 
uncertainty for agencies about which programs to prioritize and thereby foster competition 





Chapter 3: Partisanship and Committee Activity 
As reporters covering Congress, commentators, political scientists, and members 
themselves have surveyed the institution over the past decade, one common theme 
emerges: partisanship has rendered Congress unproductive and ineffective. Republicans 
and Democrats, so the argument goes, find fewer incentives to strike bipartisan deals and 
instead spend their time trying to score political points that they hope will contribute to 
electoral victories (Everett 2015; Levy 2015). Even esteemed members of other branches 
have joined in the chorus, with Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg commenting 
that partisanship has rendered Congress “not equipped really to do anything” (Kamisar 
2015). 
Such an argument typically relies on enacted laws as evidence of a partisan, 
dysfunctional Congress (Binder 2003; Eldridge 2014; Howell, et al. 2000; D. Jones 2001; 
Marcos and Cox 2014; Topaz 2014). Yet as we saw in chapter 1, a real change to 
congressional policymaking is happening at the committee level rather than an overall 
decline in Congress’s substantive lawmaking output. In this chapter I translate the logic of 
partisanship-based arguments about congressional productivity to committee 
policymaking, then systematically test those arguments. 
A committee’s decision about how to make policy is a matter of trying to establish 
policymaking authority in the face of uncertainty. Legislative policymaking can establish 
or lock in authority, but sending a bill to the floor means competing for floor space and 
time with dozens of other committees doing the same. Such was the House Agriculture 
Committee's experience in 2012, after it had spent years developing omnibus agriculture 
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legislation (the “farm bill”) only to see House Republican leaders prioritize tax and 
transportation matters (Newhauser 2012; Rogers 2012). The Senate Homeland Security 
and Government Affairs Committee saw with their 2012 cybersecurity measure, a 
committee can spend weeks, months, even years developing a particular bill only to see the 
final product fall due to political gridlock, time that could have been spent redefining the 
problem in a more favorable way or directing bureaucratic implementation. 
Partisanship in Congress, then, only heightens committee uncertainty about 
whether a bill will be debated on the floor and thus acts as an environmental constraint on 
committee policy choices. Committees often consider the partisan environment in which 
they operate when making policy decisions (Fenno 1966). Partisan conflict on the chamber 
floor can reduce the agenda even further than the natural limits on attention. In 2007, the 
House Democratic majority brought a bill to the floor to grant the District of Columbia a 
seat in the House of Representatives, but had to pull the bill when Republicans offered a 
motion to recommit the bill back to committee that would have forced a vote on D.C. gun 
ownership. Senate Democrats faced a similar dilemma in January 2014, when they had to 
decide whether to bring a budget resolution to the floor as they did in 2013, when 
“Republicans kept the Senate in well past midnight to vote on a host of politically sensitive 
amendments” (Sanchez 2014, 7). Budget Chairwoman Patty Murray (D-Wash.) and the 
Democratic leadership ultimately decided against bringing the resolution to the floor and 
subjecting their colleagues up for re-election in states like Arkansas and Louisiana to likely 
amendment votes related to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
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 Intra-party disagreements also can influence the size of the floor agenda and create 
uncertainty for committees. Floor action on omnibus agriculture legislation (the “farm 
bill”) was repeatedly delayed in 2012 even through Congress had routinely enacted 
previous iterations by wide voting margins. The Senate passed its version in June of that 
year, followed soon thereafter by House Agriculture Committee approval, committee 
member Tim Huelskamp (R-Kan.) raised objections to the bill's nutrition assistance 
program funding authorization. Republican leaders repeatedly delayed floor action fearing 
potential conservative amendments that would force their caucus to cast tough votes on 
nutrition assistance program funding. Delaying floor action on the farm bill created 
uncertainty not only for the Agriculture Committee, but also for others who saw the farm 
bill consume more congressional time and attention than anticipated, leaving less time to 
consider their own legislation. 
The previous discussion has considered the role of partisanship as a broad concept, 
which partially reflects its usage by many commentators who refer to some mix of divided 
government, polarization, lack of willingness to bargain, and dilatory action by the 
minority party when they blame “partisanship” for an unproductive institution. Political 
scientists have identified four styles, or flavors, of partisanship and party activity, each of 
which may create uncertainty for committee in different ways and thus bear on decisions 
to make policy through legislative or non-legislative means. I briefly describe them here, 
but the remainder of the chapter addresses them in turn and tests whether committee 
policymaking—the choice between legislation and oversight—responds to a committee’s 
partisan environment. 
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The first of these is what I call “purely partisan”: does one party hold a majority of 
seats in the House and Senate? Does that same party hold the presidency? The second style 
is ideological partisanship: do members of the two parties represent similar economic and 
social preferences, or are they starkly divided? The third style, party cartels, affect 
congressional procedure and focus the agenda depending on how closely aligned the 
members of the majority party are with each other. Fourth, supermajoritarian partisanship 
represents the congressional parties operating within particular institutional structures that 
require more than a simple majority of votes and, in so doing, enable legislative gridlock. 
Each of these styles could potentially contribute to a decline in committee 
legislative work, though because they are related the effects can be difficult to isolate. 
Ultimately I find very limited evidence that partisanship is directly to blame. Nevertheless, 
partisanship writ large has become such a prominent explanation for a breakdown in 
congressional legislating that it is useful to unpack the different styles and show empirically 
that they have little effect at the committee level. 
PURE PARTISANSHIP: DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 
Scholars have long debated the effects of divided government on congressional 
lawmaking, a debate that intensified following David Mayhew’s landmark study (1991) 
found no difference in important or significant laws during periods where the same party 
held the White House and congressional majorities and those periods where party control 
was split. Even as political scientists have refined their concepts, measurement strategies, 
and models, we still have a hazy picture of whether party control or split of the two 
chambers of Congress and the presidency affect legislative outputs. Depending on how one 
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classifies different laws, divided government may decrease the number of “significant” 
laws enacted but not “important” laws (Howell, et al. 2000). Divided government may 
reduce the share of the congressional agenda that gets enacted, or at least the share of those 
issues the New York Times editorial board finds notable (Binder 2003), perhaps because 
divided government tends to increase the size of the congressional agenda (Shipan 2006).  
 Yet even in the face of a mixed body of evidence, the sense persists that split party 
control makes it harder to legislate. In recent years a divided Congress or divided 
government has been blamed for “historically unproductive” congresses and, in the words 
of Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.), “the do-nothingest Congress” (Eldridge 2014; Marcos and 
Cox 2014). Such laments are curious in part because divided party control of the elected 
branches of American government has actually become less common, with three of the five 
congresses from 2003 to 2012 occurring under completely unified government (the 108th, 
109th, and 111th) and one (the 110th) with the same party holding a majority of seats in 
both chambers (see Figure 3-1). Such a trend casts doubts on divided government as an 
explanation for a decline in lawmaking, as do data previously presented in this dissertation: 
recall from Figure 1-2 that the number of legislative hearings decreased in both chambers 
during the 111th Congress (2009-10), even with a Democratic president and Democratic 
majorities in the House and Senate. 
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      103rd     108th 109th  111th  
Divided 
Branches 
   100th 101st 102nd  104th 105th 106th    110th   
Divided 
Chambers 
97th 98th 99th        107th     112th 
 
Note: Unified Control refers to the presidency and majorities of both chambers of Congress being held by the same party. Divided Branches refers to 
majorities of both chambers of Congress being held by the presidential out-party. Divided Chambers refers to a majority of seats in each chamber of 
Congress being held by a different party. The 107th Congress began as Unified Control with a 50-50 party split in the Senate and Vice President Cheney 
serving as the tie-breaking vote in favor of Republicans. On June 6, 2001, Vermont Sen. James Jeffords switched his affiliation from Republican to an 
Independent who caucused with the Democrats and effectively gave the Democrats a 51-49 majority, which held for the duration of the congress. The 
107th Congress is thus characterized overall as a Divided Congress. 
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Viewing policymaking more broadly from the committee’s perspective does not 
give us a more concrete answer, either. Some political scientists find that committee 
oversight of the executive branch increases under divided government (Aberbach 1990; 
Ainsworth, et al. 2012; Ogul and Rockman 1990; Parker and Dull 2009; Scher 1963). Still 
others find little difference in the level of oversight during times of unified and split party 
control (Mayhew 1991; Light 2014), particularly when committees and agencies tend to 
agree on policy (McGrath 2013). Indeed, a switch to unified government can produce more 
“retrospective” oversight as committee members work with bureaucrats to undo the 
previous administration’s policies (MacDonald and McGrath 2016). These studies all 
consider oversight alone, rather than as one possible way to make policy alongside 
legislating. In light of the accumulated mixed findings on divided government, I next test 
whether pure partisanship drives committee decisions about how to make policy. 
I do so with four time series cross-section beta regression models, two for House 
committee policymaking and two for Senate committees. In two of these models, the 
dependent variable is the proportion of hearings a given committee holds in a given 
congress that are legislative. In the other two models, the dependent variable is the 
proportion of bills referred to each committee that are marked up and reported to the floor 
in a given congress.5 Using beta regression models with a proportion as the dependent 
variable allows me to interpret the coefficient estimates in terms of when a committee holds 
a hearing or is referred a bill, is that hearing legislative/that bill marked up and reported to 
                                                 
5 See the methodological appendix for more on the choice of proportions as dependent variables, beta 
regression, and the use of fixed effects and time trend counters in time series cross section models. 
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the floor, thereby accounting for both variation in overall levels of committee activity and 
the fact that committees do not always hold hearings or mark up legislation. Because these 
are beta regression models, the coefficient estimates must be exponentiated to create odds 
ratios which, in this case, indicate the odds of a committee hearing being legislative 
(hearing models) or the odds of a bill referred to committee being marked up and reported 
out (bills models). When discussing the beta regression model results, I speak both of the 
coefficient estimates' statistical significance and direction and of their substantive effects 
obtained from the odds ratios. 
The key independent variables are indicators for congresses in which party control 
of the House and Senate is split between the two parties (Divided Chambers) and for those 
in which the presidential out-party has a majority of seats in both chambers (Divided 
Branches). If pure partisanship is driving the shift away from legislative work in 
committee, then the coefficient estimates for either or both of these indicators will be 
negatively signed. Each model also features a time trend counter to address potential serial 
correlation in the data. 
In keeping with the state of the literature, I obtain mixed results for the effects of 
divided government and divided partisan control of the two chambers on committee 
policymaking. Divided party control of the two chambers has a statistically significant 
negative effect on House committee hearings. Exponentiating the coefficient estimate 
reveals that a switch to split party control of the House and Senate lowers the odds that a 
House hearing will be legislative by about 39 percent. Yet the House bills reported model 
results also indicate that divided partisan control of Congress and the White House 
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increases the odds of House committees reporting out a bill by about 28 percent. I also find 
no statistically significant relationship between pure partisanship and Senate committee 
decisions to make policy through legislation (see Table 3-1). Next, I turn to party 
polarization as a possible explanation for a shift towards oversight over the past three 
decades. 
POLARIZATION 
Years ago, political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1984; 1997) 
developed a method of scaling roll call votes to measure the extent to which Republicans 
and Democrats split in their position taking. They found that voting in Congress typically 
has two dimensions. The first of these provides the strongest explanation for partisan splits, 
and corresponds to issues of economics and class. Over time, political scientists have taken 
to calling this first dimension “ideology,” with the purely moderate position scaled at zero, 
liberals receiving negative-signed scores and conservatives receiving positive-signed 
scores. The difference in average party scores along this dimension represents party 
polarization (McCarty, et al. 2006; Theriault 2008). The further apart the two parties find 
themselves along this dimension, the more polarized they are considered to be; that is, 
members of each party vote more similarly to their co-partisans and more unlike members 
of the other party.6  
                                                 
6 The voting scores used to calculate polarization, cartels, and gridlock intervals have their caveats, 
particularly that the choice of issues that comes up for a vote is not made by rank-and-file members of 
Congress and is, instead, a combination of recurring issues that must be addressed and those votes that 
would draw the sharpest distinction between the parties (Adler and Wilkerson 2012; Hall 1996; VanDoren 
1990). Still, they reflect clear position taking by members of Congress and important decisions about how 
these members represent their constituents (Kingdon 1973; Mathews and Stimson 1975). 
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Table 3-1. Testing a Purely Partisan Explanation for Committee Policymaking 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Divided Chambers -0.34 (0.12) ** -0.16 (0.10) 0.06 (0.16) -0.17 (0.14) 
Divided Branches -0.19 (0.14) 0.25 (0.12) * 0.13 (0.14) 0.06 (0.13) 
Time Trend -0.15 (0.01) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.16 (0.02) *** -0.11 (0.01) *** 
Appropriations -2.44 (0.27) *** -1.15 (0.24) *** -0.64 (0.27) * 3.96 (0.27) *** 
Budget -2.14 (0.27) *** -2.46 (0.26) *** -1.33 (0.27) *** 0.03 (0.24) 
House Administration -0.25 (0.25) -0.08 (0.20) - - 
House Rules 2.74 (0.27) *** -1.49 (0.25) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - 1.55 (0.32) *** 0.68 (0.23) ** 
     
Constant 0.38 (0.19) -1.82 (0.17) *** 0.09 (0.19) -0.42 (0.17) * 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.47 0.43 0.25 0.31 
Note: Each column represents a time series cross-section negative binomial regression model. Including only one of the indicators in each model does not 
yield statistically significant results. Alternative models with counts as the dependent variables do not yield substantively different results. 
 p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Party polarization has fluctuated over time, but the last several decades have seen a largely 
steady increase, to the extent that today the two congressional parties are more polarized 
than at any point in America’s history under the Constitution (see figure 3-2). 




Polarization has been blamed for giving us the “worst Congress ever” (until the 
next congress, anyway) (Klein 2012; Topaz 2014). The Bipartisan Policy Center, chaired 
by five former members of Congress, recently issued a report lamenting partisan divisions 
“as if our country is a sports league with competing franchises” and arguing that party 
polarization weakens American democracy (Bipartisan Policy Center 2014, 19). If 
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polarization itself makes it harder for the two parties in Congress to compromise, this may 
reduce the number of bills taken up on the floor and so create more uncertainty for 
committees about whether their legislative efforts will bear fruit. To test this explanation, 
I have again constructed a series of regression models with the same dependent variables, 
this time with a measure of polarization as the key independent variable: the difference in 
average party voting scores (McCarty, et al. 2006).7 
 As with pure partisanship I find limited evidence for a relationship between party 
polarization and a shift in committee activity away from legislation. The polarization 
coefficient estimate is only statistically significant and in the expected direction in the 
Senate bills reported model. In both Senate models, the coefficient estimate and its standard 
error are quite large, suggesting multicollinearity with the time trend counter. The 
polarization coefficient estimate is not statistically significant in either of the House models 
(see table 3-2). I thus move on to the next style of partisanship, party cartels. 
                                                 
7 I use DW-NOMINATE scores, which are designed to be more comparable across time. 
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Table 3-2. Polarization and Committee Policymaking 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Polarization -2.86 (2.29) 0.34 (1.92) 9.46 (3.66) ** -7.03 (3.24) * 
Time Trend -0.02 (0.09) -0.06 (0.07) -0.36 (0.08) *** 0.04 (0.07) 
Appropriations -2.39 (0.27) *** -1.18 (0.24) *** -0.63 (0.27) ** 3.94 (0.27) *** 
Budget -2.11 (0.27) *** -2.43 (0.26) *** -1.29 (0.27) *** 0.06 (0.24) 
House Administration 0.29 (0.28) -0.08 (0.21) - - 
House Rules 2.80 (0.28) *** -1.51 (0.25) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - 1.52 (0.32) *** 0.68 (0.23) ** 
     
Constant 1.34 (1.12) -1.81 (0.94) -2.37 (4.45) 3.18 (1.70) 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.46 0.42 0.26 0.32 
Note: Each column represents a time series cross-section beta regression model. Alternative models with counts as the dependent variables do not yield 
substantively different results. 
 p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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PARTISAN CARTELS 
One approach to congressional agenda setting that explicitly incorporates parties is 
the cartel theory. According to this theory, members of Congress secure re-election as 
members of a national party, based on the agenda they enact and maintenance of the 
institution (Cox and McCubbins 1993). To enhance its “brand,” the majority party tries to 
restrict the agenda to those issues that will keep its brand identity consistent; that is, to 
those issues that unify its members. The party does so by controlling important procedural 
positions such as committee chairs (and, in the House, particularly the Rules Committee). 
The majority party’s collective identity becomes muddled when it loses votes on the 
chamber floor (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005; Den Hartog and Monroe 2011). 
Committees thus play an important role in helping cartelized parties structure the 
legislative agenda by keeping those bills that would muddle the party’s brand identity from 
reaching the floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). 
Cartels become stronger when the majority party is more homogenous—when party 
members are more apt to agree on what their national agenda should be. As the average 
member of the majority party presents an ideology or voting record that is further away 
from the average member of the chamber, the majority party needs to block a wider range 
of issues from reaching the floor in order to keep a consistent brand, and so committees are 
responsible for blocking more legislation. As this distance grows then, we might expect 
committees to spend less time on legislation.  
The “cartel range,” or distance between the average voting member of each 
chamber and the average member of the majority party in that chamber, has fluctuated over 
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the past several decades, and the dynamics in the House and Senate have been similar (see 
figure 3-3). The majority parties were closer to the average member of Congress in the 
mid-1980s (99th and 100th Congresses) then further away, with the average majority party 
members voting most dissimilarly from the average members of Congress in 2003-2004 
(108th Congress). The majority party and the average member of Congress have grown 
closer since then, and in the Senate they are the closest they have been since the early 
1990s. On that point, while the shape of the two chamber’s trends is similar, the Senate has 
oscillated more extremely, with both smaller and greater distances between the average 
majority party member and average senator than in the House over this period. The large 
swings in the Senate’s cartel range may be due to the upper chamber’s smaller size, where 
movement by or replacement of even a few senators can have a larger effect on her party’s 
average vote score. 
If committee decisions about how to make policy correspond to their roles in party 
cartels, then we should expect committees to devote less of their policymaking activity to 
legislation in times when the average majority party member and the average member of 
their particular chamber are further apart ideologically. To test this expectation, I have 
constructed regression models with the proportion of committee activity that is legislative 
as dependent variables and the distance between the average majority party member voting 
score and the average chamber member voting score in each congress as the independent 




Figure 3-3. Trends in Majority Party Cartels, 1981-2012 
 
Source: Voteview.com, calculated by the author 
 
Once again, I find no statistically significant relationship between partisanship, this 
time parties-as-cartels, and House committee policymaking (see table 3-3). That is, the 
ideological distance between the average majority party member and the average voting 
member in the House seems to influence neither the share of hearings a committee holds 
that are legislative nor the proportion of bills in a committee’s jurisdiction that are reported 
to the floor, the latter of which in particular is a key prediction of the cartel theory. The 
coefficient estimate for the cartel interval is statistically significant and positive in the 
Senate bills reported model, contra expectations of the cartel theory of party agenda 
control. 
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Table 3-3. Party Cartels and Committee Policymaking 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Maj. Party-Floor Avg. 
Distance 
-0.52 (0.67) 0.22 (0.55) 0.05 (0.38) 1.17 (0.33) *** 
Time Trend -0.12 (0.01) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.17 (0.02) *** -0.11 (0.01) *** 
Appropriations -2.37 (0.27) *** -1.19 (0.24) *** -0.62 (0.27) * 3.83 (0.27) *** 
Budget -2.11 (0.27) *** -2.43 (0.26) *** -1.31 (0.27) *** 0.08 (0.24) 
House Administration -0.30 (0.26) -0.08 (0.21) - - 
House Rules 2.82 (0.28) *** -1.52 (0.25) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - 1.54 (0.32) *** 0.68 (0.23) ** 
     
Constant 0.15 (0.29) -1.73 (0.24) *** 0.17 (0.21) -0.99 (0.18) *** 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.46 0.42 0.25 0.33 
Note: Each column represents a time series cross-section beta regression model. Alternative models with counts as the dependent variables do not yield 
substantively different results. 
 p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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GRIDLOCK 
 The final flavor of partisanship considered here is supermajoritarian partisanship, 
in which the two congressional parties operate under institutional rules that require more 
than a simple majority of votes to succeed. The two most relevant of such rules are the 
three-fifths requirement to override a presidential veto and the two-thirds requirement to 
overcome Senate filibusters that was in place prior to 2013. These two rules are part of 
Keith Krehbiel’s (1998) pivotal politics model. Krehbiel notes that the two 
supermajoritarian requirements enforce gridlock—the inability to change the status quo 
policy—without making legislating completely impossible (gridlock is common, but not 
constant). The members who need to be swayed to override a veto or vote in favor of cloture 
to end a filibuster are thus “pivotal” for making policy, and the range of policies that lie 
between their voting preferences represents the “gridlock interval” in which no status quo 
can be changed 
While Krehbiel (1993; 1998) downplays the role of parties in organizing 
congressional position taking, the gridlock model relies on party to the extent that the party 
of the president determines which member is pivotal for overriding vetoes and which is 
pivotal for overcoming a filibuster (in the language of his model, which side you start from 
to determine each pivot). Furthermore, these two supermajoritarian requirements have 
become party tools to oppose or obstruct policies that either the president or the 
congressional majority support (Koger 2010; Smith 2014; Theriault 2013). If a majority 
does not have the two-thirds or three-fifths needed, it must convince members of the 
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minority party to vote with them, otherwise the veto will stand or a bill will be filibustered 
until it is withdrawn or it dies at the end of a congress. 
 Such gridlock makes lawmaking harder and so creates more uncertainty for 
committees; indeed, the cybersecurity bill that was to be Sen. Lieberman’s last major 
legislative legacy before his retirement was killed by a filibuster, giving the Senate 
Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee nothing to show for its years of 
work spent on the bill. A larger gridlock interval means the pool of policies that might see 
significant change is smaller, which in turn might decrease the incentive for committees to 
devote time and effort into advancing legislation. 
 Krehbiel (1998) devised his model to recall a unicameral legislature, and the U.S. 
Congress has a House and Senate. Poole (1998) used data on members of Congress who 
served in both the House and Senate to calculate “common space” voting scores that place 
senators and House members along the same continuum as if they were voting in the same 
unicameral legislature. From these scores we can find the members of Congress in either 
chamber who are pivotal for ending filibusters and overriding presidential vetoes and thus 
calculate the size of the gridlock interval in a given congress (Chiou and Rothenberg 2006; 
2008). 
The congressional gridlock intervals (the distance between the veto and filibuster 
pivots) has grown over time, particularly beginning with the 104th Congress, after 
Republicans gained a majority of House seats in the 1994 elections. The interval shrunk 
slightly in 2009-10 (the 111th Congress), but increased again the following congress (see 
figure 3-4, panel A). Panel B takes this analysis a step further by decomposing the gridlock 
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interval into its component parts: the respective locations of the veto and filibuster pivots. 
Because the voting scores of these pivotal members might be positive or negative 
depending on whether that member voted in a liberal or conservative direction, I take the 
absolute value of these voting scores. The result gives us a pivotal legislator’s extremity 
(distance) from zero, the moderate voting position on the continuum. 
Doing so reveals that members of Congress taking up both pivotal positions have 
become more extreme (further from zero) over time, the veto pivot more so than the 
filibuster pivot. During most of the 1980s, the member pivotal for overcoming a filibuster 
displayed more extreme voting patterns than the member pivotal for overriding a veto. That 
changed in 1993-4 (the 103rd Congress), when a large amount of electoral turnover (about 
one-quarter of members serving that congress were freshmen) made a fairly moderate 
senator, Bob Packwood (R-Ore., voting score = 0.074), pivotal for overcoming filibusters 
(see Figure 3-4, panel B). 
Interestingly when one considers the ever-increasing trend in party polarization, 
recent congresses have seen relatively less extreme pivotal legislators (with the exception 
of the filibuster pivot in 2011-2). For the veto pivot this trend begins in the 110th Congress 
(2007-8), while for the filibuster pivot it begins even earlier, in 2001-2 (the 107th 
Congress). Also notable is that the most extreme voting scores of any of the pivotal 
members during this time period both belong to Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky., voting 
score in both cases = 0.324) who was the veto override pivot while also serving as the 
Majority Whip during the 109th Congress and the filibuster pivot in the 112th Congress 
while also serving as Minority Leader. 
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Figure 3-4. Trends in Gridlock Intervals, 1981-2012 
Panel A: Gridlock Interval 
 
Panel B: Extremity of Two Pivots 
 
Source: Voteview.com, calculated by the author 
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 I next test whether the increasing gridlock intervals have contributed to committees 
shifting their activity away from legislation and towards conducting oversight. The 
independent variable of interest in these models is the difference in “common space” voting 
scores of the member pivotal for overriding a presidential veto and the member pivotal for 
ending a filibuster. As before, the models all include a time trend counter to address 
potential serial correlation in the data. And as before, I find few statistically significant 
relationship between the size of the gridlock interval and committee legislative activity (see 
table 3-4). The only gridlock coefficient estimate that is statistically significant is positive 
in the Senate hearings model, which runs counter to the hypothesized relationship between 
partisanship and legislative policymaking. Alternate models using only chamber-specific 
voting scores do not produce substantively different findings.8 
WHITHER PARTISANSHIP? 
 Political scientists, media members, and both current and former members of 
Congress have pointed to partisanship as a root cause of congressional dysfunction and a 
decline in productivity, at least so far as productivity is defined as enacting laws. As seen 
thus far, the conventional wisdom has little empirical support. First, as discussed in 
previous chapters, Congress has more responsibilities than simply enacting laws: namely, 
oversight, problem definition, and other forms of non-legislative activity. 
 
                                                 
8 For the House models, the distance between the median member and the veto pivot; for the Senate 
models, the distance between the veto and filibuster pivots. 
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Table 3-4. Gridlock Intervals and Committee Policymaking 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Gridlock Interval -0.06 (1.07) 0.79 (0.90) 3.36 (1.22) ** 2.13 (1.11) 
Time Trend -0.12 (0.02) *** -0.06 (0.02) *** -0.21 (0.02) *** -0.13 (0.02) *** 
Appropriations -2.37 (0.27) *** -1.20 (0.24) *** -0.65 (0.27) * 3.90 (0.27) *** 
Budget -2.10 (0.27) *** -2.43 (0.26) *** -1.32 (0.27) *** 0.02 (0.24) 
House Administration -0.32 (0.26) -0.09 (0.21) - - 
House Rules 2.86 (0.28) *** -1.52 (0.25) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - 1.64 (0.33) *** 0.69 (0.23) ** 
     
Constant -0.04 (0.36) -1.89 (0.31) *** -1.38 (0.99) -1.17 (0.38) ** 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.46 0.42 0.27 0.31 
Note: Each column represents a time series cross-section beta regression model. Alternative models with counts as the dependent variables do not yield 
substantively different results. 
 p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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 Second, as seen in chapter 1, laments about partisanship predate any decline in the 
number of substantive laws enacted; rather, the story is one of a shift in committee activity 
away from legislation and towards non-legislative policymaking. As this chapter has 
showed, partisanship is not the main explanation for even those trends. Across two 
chambers, two different types of committee legislative activity, and four different measures 
of partisanship, the relationship between committee policymaking and partisanship is weak 
at best. 
Despite the lack of consistent evidence, I caution against concluding that 
partisanship by itself has no effect on committee activity. Other ways partisanship might 
(and likely do) influence committee policymaking are through the content of legislation 
and tenor of oversight coming out of a committee, and potentially its choice of issues to 
address. This chapter also has considered partisanship as an environmental constraint on 
committee activity; examining partisanship within a committee is another possible area in 
which to search for its effects. I also have been careful to note that partisanship within 
Congress or even the House or Senate specifically has not seemed to directly influence 
committee policymaking. In the next chapter I show that the congressional parties have 
become stronger over time and in so doing have imbued party leaders with more legislative 
authority and determining whether and which committees are responsible for setting the 
agenda and shaping outcomes. As that authority has shifted away from committees, they 
find themselves with fewer incentives to spend time competing for it and so spend more 
time conducting oversight. 
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Chapter 4: Centralization in Congress and Shifts in Legislative 
Authority 
 As we saw in previous chapter, partisanship writ large cannot directly explain the 
shift away from legislative activity by congressional committees no matter how 
partisanship is measured. Such limited results do not mean, however, that congressional 
parties are irrelevant to the shift in committee policymaking towards oversight. In this 
chapter I show that it is specifically the centralization of agenda setting by party leaders 
that has led to a shift in the contours and availability of legislative authority, which in turn 
has altered how committees compete with one another for that authority to make policy. 
 The chapter begins with a brief recapitulation of legislative authority as a concept 
and how it drives committee decisions about how to make policy, then describes changes 
to the legislative process over the past 35 years and how they affect committee legislative 
authority. I focus on two rules changes in particular, one in each chamber: in the House, a 
1995 alteration of the rules governing bill referral; in the Senate, the increase in cloture 
motions and floor fights over filibusters. I then provide empirical tests of my hypotheses 
and discuss the substantive effects of these changes to congressional rules and practice. 
Specifically, the House rules change has decreased incentives for committees to legislate, 
while an increase in filibuster fights on the Senate floor have driven both Senate and House 
committees towards non-legislative activities. 
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN CONGRESS AND CENTRALIZATION 
Legislatures face a number of issues that require their attention, and a committee 
system can alleviate the demands on the legislature's agenda by devoting attention to 
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multiple issues at once (Adler and Wilkerson 2012; Cooper 1970; Krehbiel 1991; 
McConachie 1898). Committees are explicitly given a jurisdiction which imbues that 
committee with policymaking authority: the ability to act or not act on an issue or set of 
issues. Legislative authority allows a committee to decide between action and inaction, and 
among different types of action; this includes gatekeeping authority and veto power over 
proposals in its jurisdiction (subject to majoritarian considerations and procedures such as 
the discharge petition that allow members to remove bills from committee and bring them 
to the floor). 
Decision making authority in legislatures like the U.S. Congress is the ability to 
make policy-relevant decisions for oneself. For committees, this means being able to 
decide what issues to pursue and how to pursue them, whether through legislation or non-
legislative activities. Committees are driven not only by what authority they currently have, 
but what authority might be gained or lost in the future. Spending time and effort a bill 
makes it more likely that a committee will be put in charge of floor debate and conference 
committee proceedings (Bawn 1996). Holding hearings on a given issue confers some 
validity to future jurisdictional claims (King 1997; Talbert, et al. 1995), which in turn gives 
that committee policymaking authority over a larger set of issues. Even if a committee 
wants to make policy through oversight of the executive branch, the ability to potentially 
follow up on such action with legislation—that is, the authority to do so—strengthens the 
signal that oversight sends to agencies about how to make policy (Aberbach 1990). It is 
specifically the prospect of legislative authority, then, that fosters competition among 
committees for issue jurisdiction and legislative agenda space. Authority does not only 
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refer to the ability to make policy, but also to the ability to decide not to make policy 
through gatekeeping, lack of attention, or other means. 
Once conferred, legislative authority is sticky; that is, one committee’s action does 
not necessarily take authority away from another, but rather creates additional competition 
for authority. Committees do not lose jurisdiction over an issue unless the House or Senate 
changes its rules specifying those jurisdictions. One committee chair may write a waiver 
letter to another ceding jurisdiction over a bill, but such a letter only applies to that specific 
bill; the chair is not waiving jurisdiction absolutely (Baughman 2006). At the same time, 
the opportunities for committees to compete for, gain, or hold onto their legislative 
authority change over time, which in turn changes their decisions about how to incur and 
try to recoup the opportunity costs that come with making policy. 
The mid-20th Century saw the beginning of a shift away from what we know as the 
“Textbook Congress,” wherein committees acted as “Congress at work” and held a high 
degree of policymaking authority within their jurisdictions. The U.S. political system had 
changed dramatically in the preceding decades, including an increase in government 
activity after World War II described in more detail in the next chapter and an explosion 
in interest group activity. The U.S. Congress faced an increasing number of policy and 
political demands and found itself struggling to keep pace with an executive branch that 
was rapidly developing policy expertise and technological capacity. At the same time, the 
electorate was changing and newer legislators were growing frustrated by their inability to 
respond to their constituents and institutional demands as they saw fit (Dodd and Schott 
1979; Sinclair 1989). 
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Congress initially responded to these changes with both centralization and 
decentralization. Changes within the institution and particularly within the Democratic 
Caucuses empowered both party leaders and subcommittees at the expense of largely older, 
more conservative committee chairs. Norms of deference declined and rank-and-file 
members began exercising their institutional prerogatives to a greater degree (Davidson 
and Oleszek 1977; Galloway 1953; Smith and Deering 1990; Sinclair 1989). Members of 
both parties endowed party leaders with greater responsibility for coordinating the 
legislative process as the two parties became more internally homogeneous and were more 
apt to agree on how such control should be exercised and as Congress's issue environment 
grew beyond the institution's ability to comprehensively address emerging policy problems 
(Dodd [1981] 2012, Rohde 1991; Smith 1989; Sundquist 1981). To say that Congress is 
more centralized today than it was in the 1970s is not to say that committees have abdicated 
all agenda-setting responsibility; committee leaders in particular remain involved in 
advancing issues and doing the actual work of writing bills. Yet party leaders today 
inarguably are more involved in negotiating legislative deals and determining the lines of 
legislative authority than they were in the “Textbook Congress.” Such centralization is 
important because it alters the incentives for committees to compete with one another to 
process and prioritize information for congressional action. 
 In their theory of authority allocation within organizations, Aghion and Tirole 
(1997) make an important distinction between formal and real authority. The former refers 
to the right to decide, while the latter is the effective control over organization decisions. 
Centralized, leader-driven agenda setting has not necessarily eliminated formal committee 
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authority; committees still exercise jurisdiction over legislation and can organize hearings 
independent of the party leadership. Yet as party leaders become more directly involved in 
the legislative process, they diminish committees' real authority over the institution's policy 
decisions, and in so doing alter committee incentives to compete for information and 
agenda space. Increased party leader involvement can be seen throughout the legislative 
process, but several changes stand out for their potential influence over committee 
decisions about whether to pursue legislation. The next section describes two changes to 
congressional rules, one in the House and one in the Senate, and one change to 
congressional practice that have altered the lines of formal and real legislative authority for 
party leaders and committees and in so doing have reduced the incentives for committees 
to compete for legislative authority. 
SHIFTS IN LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY: A TALE OF TWO CHAMBERS 
 The first relevant leader-driven process is the referral of legislation to multiple 
committees, which began in the 1970s and allows leaders to coordinate committee activity. 
In the U.S. Congress, the large majority of bills are referred to one committee and only one 
committee, and so committees easily retain legislative authority over the issues those bills 
would address. In 1975, the U.S. House of Representatives instituted a multiple referral 
system whereby some bills are sent to more than one committee. Senate leaders also may 
refer bills to multiple committees, though they do so at a lower rate, which reflects the 
lower priority given to committee specialization in the upper chamber (Davidson 1989).  
The multiple referral system arose in response to several factors. First, when only 
one committee has authority over a particular bill it possesses inordinate gatekeeping 
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power and thus control over the broader institution's agenda that requires effort, time, and 
other resources by other committees and legislators to overcome. Second, not every issue 
fits neatly into a given jurisdictional arrangement, and this can be particularly true of issues 
that emerge on the legislature's agenda after the committee system is established and 
jurisdictions are set. Rep. Jonathan Bingham (D-N.Y.) asserted in 1973 that, “one of the 
major deficiencies in the House rules is the lack of any regular procedure to provide for 
those cases where parts of the bill fall within the jurisdiction of more than one committee” 
(quoted in Davidson, et al. 1988, 5). The lack of certainty about how to refer legislation is 
particularly true of new and emerging issues that lack a record of committee hearings 
devoted to defining them. As one congressional staff director put it a few decades ago, 
“who has ‘expertise’ on competitiveness? People don't even know what the problem is” 
(King 1997, 112).  
Multiply-referred bills quickly became a larger part of the House's legislative 
workload (Davidson, et al. 1988) and introduced a series of new trade-offs into the 
legislative process and committee competition for jurisdiction and policymaking authority. 
Referring bills to multiple committees encourages inter-committee communication and 
cooperation as committees now can let their competitors bear many of the transaction costs 
associated with legislative action (Baughman 2006). But as Bawn (1996, 254-5) writes:  
Multiple referral does not inevitably strip a committee of gate-keeping 
power. Rather, it forces a committee to take costly action to gain the veto 
power obtained costlessly with single referral...multiple referral is, 
however, good for channeling extraordinary influence to the committee 
with the most at stake. 
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That is, the multiple referral process encourages committees to compete with one another 
to define policy problems, conduct oversight, and decide whether to legislate on issues 
within their jurisdictions. 
 Consider a bill introduced in the U.S. House that would create new workplace 
safety regulations and reporting requirements for businesses. Given the subject matter, the 
bill might be referred to both the Education and the Workforce Committee and the Small 
Business Committee, the latter of which might seek laxer requirements or provide funding 
assistance for smaller businesses affected by the proposed law. When legislation is referred 
to multiple committees, each of those committees is uncertain about which of them will 
have authority and responsibility for shepherding the bill through the legislative process 
(Collie and Cooper 1989). The bill text that reaches the floor and potentially passes would 
depend on inter-committee interactions and determines future jurisdiction allocations, 
decisions about who oversees floor debate, and conference committee appointments (Bawn 
1996; Deering 1982; King 1997). 
The two committees could cooperate and influence these determinations 
themselves (Baughman 2006), but if not then they might hold competing hearings that 
attempt to demonstrate (or develop) their issue expertise and lay the groundwork for their 
respective preferred positions. If the two committees compete, then majority party leaders 
must step in and arbitrate between the competing claims of authority (Davidson, et al. 1988; 
Davidson and Oleszek 1992), which includes bargaining over gatekeeping and legislative 
outcomes (Patty 2007). For these reasons, multiple referrals “have revolutionized 
committee consideration of complex bills and resolutions, [and] form a cornerstone of the 
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party leaders' enhanced role in managing legislative business” (Davidson 1989, 376-7). 
Over time (see figure 4-1). 
Figure 4-1. Multiple Referrals in the House of Representatives 




Panel B: Multiple Referrals by Committee 
 
Source: Congressional Bills Project, calculated by the author 
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When the House instituted its multiple referral system in 1975, it created several 
different types: joint referral, the most common of these, whereby two or more committees 
receive a bill at the same time; split referral, whereby different committees are given 
responsibility over different parts of the same bill; and sequential referral, whereby two or 
more committees receive a bill in succession. The House later adopted a rule that allowed 
the Speaker of the House to impose time limits on the first committee to which a bill was 
referred. 
Congress found its committee system once again fragmenting with the changing 
issue environment of the 1980s, and in response the House of Representatives overhauled 
its rules in 1993 and again in 1995. These changes included first restricting the number of 
subcommittees that most committees could organize and the total number of assignments 
a member could hold, and later eliminating several committees entirely. Most relevant for 
the current discussion, after Republicans won a majority of seats in the 1994 election, Newt 
Gingrich and other party leaders brought with them a cohesive agenda on which they 
wanted to act quickly, and they saw a fragmented committee system as a possible hindrance 
to doing so. As Sinclair (2007, 14) writes, “When the Republicans first took the majority, 
committee chairs were under intense pressure from the party leadership and the 
membership to not allow turf fights to interfere with passing bills on the Republican 
agenda.” 
To combat this inertia (brought on in part by competition for jurisdiction and 
legislative authority) and reduce demand for post-referral coordination, the Republican 
majority changed the House Rules to streamline the bill referral process and instruct House 
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speakers to designate a committee of primary referral. That is to say, since 1995, when a 
bill is referred to multiple committees, one of those committees is put “in charge” of that 
bill and decides whether or not to act on it.9 Research on legislative committees and 
multiple referrals largely was published before the shift to a primary referral system, and 
so the rules change’s implications for committee work—including committees' decisions 
about whether to legislate, cooperate over legislative outcomes, and compete for 
jurisdiction and legislative authority—have not fully been explored. But in laying out how 
multiple referrals fostered incentives to compete for legislative jurisdiction and authority, 
this literature suggests that designating a “primary” committee establishes that authority 
from the outset and thus reduce incentives for committee legislative activity. 
 As seen in Figure 4-1, the percentage of bills referred to multiple committees did 
not change after 1994; on average about 76 percent of bills in the U.S. House of 
Representatives are referred to only one committee, even after the “primary” referral 
process was instituted. Nevertheless, by designating a primary committee, the Speaker of 
the House (along with the Parliamentarian) determines which committee will have 
functional responsibility for providing the bill that reaches the floor calendar, managing 
debate, and potentially engaging in inter-chamber negotiation over the final legislative 
product. Rather than legislative responsibility and authority be driven by interactions 
among committees, centralizing agenda setting has allowed party leaders to make that 
determination at the beginning of the process. For the “primary” committees, the speaker 
                                                 
9 A 2003 rules change has allowed the speaker to designate more than one primary committee in 
“extraordinary” circumstances. 
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already has given the committee of primary referral a low-cost, credible means of claiming 
authority for that bill, and so those committees may not need to spend as much time and 
effort claiming legislative authority through hearings.  
Any other committee that received the same bill faces a choice of whether to accept 
the referral decision and privately cooperate with the primary committee in amending (or 
deciding not to amend) that bill while investing time, effort, and other resources into other 
policymaking activities. For a “secondary committee,” going along with the primary 
committee's preferred bill also means potentially ceding some claims to real legislative 
authority on future legislation. Alternatively, the secondary committee(s) could choose to 
incur opportunity costs by holding hearings and attempting to gain or retain real legislative 
authority, even as those efforts are unlikely to bear fruit; the declaration of which 
committee is primary for that bill has already occurred. I thus hypothesize that House 
committees with more multiply-referred bills in their jurisdiction will spend less time on 
legislation relative to oversight after the 1995 rules change.  
Primary Referral Hypothesis: House committees with more multiply-




 The second set of changes to the legislative process have influenced Senate 
obstruction and agenda space. One of the features that distinguishes the Senate from the 
House of Representatives is that debate rules in the upper chamber lack a provision that 
allows senators to “move the previous question”—end debate and immediately vote on the 
pending issue. So long as one senator does not yield the floor, she can talk for as long as 
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she wants about any subject, whether it is relevant to the legislation pending on the calendar 
or not. Similarly, an individual senator can place a “hold” on a pending bill or nomination 
that prevents it from being considered on the floor. These features give individual rank-
and-file senators more power than similarly situated colleagues in the House. This power 
that individual senators hold has typically been thought to come at the expense of both 
committees and party leaders (Sinclair 1989). 
In 1917, senators adopted a rule (Rule 22) that would provide a means for ending 
filibusters. A senator must file a motion to invoke cloture (co-signed by at least 15 
colleagues). If agreed to, debate continues for a prescribed period of time before the Senate 
votes on the pending question. The time spent on filibusters and holds pushes items off of 
the floor agenda and create opportunity costs for chamber consideration, which in turn 
creates uncertainty for committees about whether their bills will reach the floor at all and 
so recoup some of the opportunity costs of making policy through legislation rather than 
oversight (Binder and Smith 1996; Koger 2010; Wawro and Schickler 2006).  In 2015, for 
example, a floor fight over a bill to combat human trafficking delayed action on Loretta 
Lynch’s nomination to be attorney general (Everett 2015). Senate filibusters historically 
have been a costly form of obstruction since they require sustained opposition, but over 
time the Senate has repeatedly moved to lower these costs by reducing both the threshold 
of support needed to invoke cloture and the number of “post-cloture” hours before a vote 
could be held. 
The first attempt to reduce the cost of filibustering came in 1964 following 
extensive filibusters of the Civil Rights Act, when Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield 
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(D-Mont.) and Majority Whip Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) created a “two-track” system for 
debating legislation. Prior to this, Mansfield had first cleared other “must-pass” legislation 
from the Senate’s agenda in anticipation of a long debate over civil rights when other work 
would not be able to occur. Under the two-track system, a filibuster on a bill or nomination 
could continue while the Senate moved on to consider other business (Koger 2010). While 
this system allows other legislation to move forward, it also places less of a burden on the 
filibustering senator because they are not obstructing other business in addition to the bill 
or nomination they oppose. 
Initially, two-thirds of voting senators needed to vote in favor of invoking cloture 
in order for a filibuster to end and debate to proceed, and there was no time limit specified 
for when to move to a vote once cloture had been invoked; that is, post-cloture debate time 
still was unlimited, in essence maintaining the filibuster even when two-thirds of the Senate 
agreed that it should end. In 1975, the Senate voted to require a three-fifths (60) vote 
threshold to invoke cloture on measures that would not amend Senate Rules. Post-cloture 
debate time still was unrestricted, and a senator could call up any amendment filed before 
cloture had been invoked, which created de facto filibuster opportunities even after the 
Senate had voted to end debate. Senators voted in 1979 to limit post-cloture debate time to 
100 hours. Doing so had little effect, because the threat to delay action for 100 additional 
hours was akin to a threat to delay indefinitely (Sinclair 1989). 
 With C-SPAN about to extend live television coverage to Senate floor proceedings, 
senators voted in 1986 to reduce post-cloture debate time to 30 hours. This change reduces 
the amount of time spent on any one filibustered bill or nomination by about one-third (or 
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more), but in doing so it essentially allows three filibuster efforts to take the place of one. 
While cloture filings do not directly measure filibusters and holds, they at least signal floor 
fights that take up floor time and space that could be devoted to other matters (CRS 2013). 
By reducing the burden of post-cloture obstruction and debate, the Senate in essence made 
filibustering “cheaper.” As more cloture petitions have been filed over time to counteract 
the increased obstruction, the chamber's legislative agenda has become even more 
restricted, which reduces committee incentives to undertake legislative activity. 
The increased incidence of filibusters and of cloture motions to overcome them is 
additionally notable because these efforts to end filibusters often are driven by party 
leaders. the majority and minority leaders and the party whips, even as cloture motions 
have risen dramatically over time, from about 30 in 1981-1982 to more than double that 
beginning in the 1990s (103rd Congress) and between 110 and 140 from the 110th through 
112th Congresses (2007-2012; 253 cloture motions were filed in 2013-2014) (see figure 4-
2). All but a handful of these cloture motions were filed by party leadership; the exception 
came from 1995 to 1998 (the 104th and 105th Congresses), when about one-third of cloture 




                                                 
10 It is doubtful that these anomalies are due to the particular styles of the party leaders at the time. The 
same leadership teams in place during the 104th Congress also were party leaders in the 103rd Congress, 
when 17 percent of cloture motions were filed by non-leaders; likewise, the party leadership teams of the 
105th Congress carried over to the 106th, when non-party leaders filed just 11 percent of the 71 cloture 
motions. 
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Figure 4-2. Senate Cloture Motions And Majority Party Leader Involvement 
 
 
Source: Senate.gov, calculated by the author.  
 
Whereas filing a cloture motion signals to exert costly time, effort, and attention 
that could be spent on other matters, a party leader relieves a committee member of that 
burden when he files them and controls the debate time himself. Party leaders already 
communicate with each other about the floor schedule in the course of their regular duties 
and so find it easier to coordinate action. On the one hand this frees up committee leaders 
to do other things and eliminates an additional source of opportunity costs on their time. 
On the other, lowering the cost of obstruction (and fighting obstruction) by shifting the 
costs to party leaders allows those floor fights to become regularized. It is then not a single 
filibuster and floor fight that pushes other items off the schedule, as with the 1964 Civil 
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Rights Act, but the multiplicity of that creates uncertainty for committees. Centralizing 
floor fights within the party leadership additionally shifts some of the sources of Senate 
committee legislative authority, including managing debate and shaping a bill by 
negotiating which amendments will be accepted. I thus hypothesize that Senate committees 
will shift their policymaking away from legislation and towards oversight as more cloture 
motions are filed and more leadership-driven floor fights ensue. 
Senate Cloture Hypothesis: Senate committees will conduct less legislative 
activity as more cloture motions are filed. 
 
 Filibusters and cloture motions also may increase uncertainty for House committees 
by leaving less agenda space for House bills or for Senate companions that might otherwise 
result in bicameral negotiations and enactments. I therefore hypothesize that House 
committees also will shift their activity towards oversight as they see more Senate cloture 
motions and floor fights. 
House Cloture Hypothesis: House committees will conduct less legislative 
activity as more cloture motions are filed. 
 
The next section tests the three hypotheses laid out above. 
Data/Analysis 
Shifts in the contours and availability of legislative authority, I argue, have led to 
shifts in committee activity away from legislation in two ways: through a change to the 
House rules governing legislation referred to multiple committees and in the rise in Senate 
filibusters and particularly (leader-driven) efforts to overcome these filibusters through 
cloture motions. In order to test the specific hypotheses laid out in the previous section I 
use the same dependent variables seen in the previous chapter. I test the Multiple Referral 
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Hypothesis with a measure of the percentage of bills referred to a given committee that 
also were referred to some other committee, interacted with an indicator variable that takes 
the value 0 for congresses prior to the 1995 rules change and 1 for congresses subsequent 
to the rules change. I test the two Cloture Motion hypotheses with a count of the cloture 
motions filed in the previous congress to avoid muddling temporal causality. The models 
again include a time trend counter and fixed effects for the appropriations, budget, rules, 
and chamber administration committees, and they control for based on the previous 
chapter’s findings. 
The results confirm that shifts in legislative authority and specifically centralization 
by party leaders that have shifted committee activity away from legislation and towards 
oversight. The Multiple Referral Hypothesis is confirmed for House hearings, where the 
multiple referral percentage post-rules change interaction term is statistically significant 
and negative. This finding indicates that committees that face more multiply-referred bills 
have been less likely to hold legislative hearings and make claims to responsibility for 
moving forward on those bills since the House of Representatives changed its rules in 1995 
to let the speaker designate a committee of primary referral (see table 4-1). Substantively, 
for every increase of percentage point in the volume of bills in a committee jurisdictions 
that also are referred elsewhere, the odds of one of that committee’s hearings being 
legislative decrease by about two percent; when that committee makes policy, it is less 
likely to do so through legislation. Most of the committees during this time period had 
between 20 and 60 percent of their bills also referred elsewhere, meaning the odds of those 
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committees making policy through legislation after 1995 as much as halved or even 
dropped near zero (see figure 4-3). 
Figure 4-3. Effects of Switch to “Primary Referral” System on Committee Hearings 
 
 
Both the Senate Cloture and House Cloture hypotheses also are confirmed, again 
specifically for legislative hearings. Interestingly, each additional Senate cloture motion 
filed in the previous congress decreases the odds that a hearing will be legislative by about 
one percent in both the Senate and the House (see table 4-1). And as illustrated in Figure 
4-2, over time these decreases have rapidly accumulated as cloture motions have 
skyrocketed. Floor fights and the ensuing restrictions on agenda space in the Senate also 
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create uncertainty for committees in the lower chamber, who have responded my devoting 
more time and resources to non-legislative activities. 
Finally, the two partisanship variables carried over from the previous chapter do 
not result in statistically significant coefficient estimates here. When controlling for shifts 
in legislative authority and uncertainty created by more Senate floor fights, what direct 
effects of partisanship may have existed lose their explanatory weight. To the extent that 
the shift in committee policymaking is a party-driven story, it is one being told through the 
centralization of agenda setting rather than direct measures like polarization, divided 
government, or gridlock. 
CONCLUSION 
The previous chapter showed that partisanship alone cannot explain the shift in 
congressional committee activity away from legislation and towards oversight that we have 
seen over the past 30 years. This chapter has shown that stronger parties in are still part of 
the story of Congress’s shift towards oversight since the 1980s. Specifically, the 
centralization of agenda setting responsibility and authority to party leaders over time has 
created more uncertainty in the Senate and fewer incentives in the House for committees 
to stake their claim to such authority by holding legislative hearings or by marking up and 
reporting bills out to the floor. Such a finding has important implications for those who 
would overhaul congressional operations and try to foster an environment where committee 
legislative work is once again prized; chapter 6 picks up this theme. 
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Table 4-1. Changes to Legislative Authority and Congressional Committee Policymaking 
 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Leg. Authority     
Mult. Ref. × Post-1995 -0.01 (0.006) * -0.004 (0.005) - - 
Mult. Ref. Perc. 0.0003 (0.005) 0.01 (0.004) - - 
Post-1995 Indicator 0.91 (0.55) -0.15 (0.47) - - 
Cloture Motions -0.01 (0.003) ** -0.0004 (0.003) -0.02 (0.004) *** -0.01 (0.004) 
Partisanship     
Divided Chambers -0.16 (0.16) -0.24 (0.14) -0.14 (0.15) -0.11 (0.14) 
Polarization -4.89 (5.46) 5.86 (4.68) 21.35 (4.63) *** -3.03 (4.16) 
Controls     
Time Trend -0.08 (0.17) -0.26 (0.14) -0.50 (0.09) *** -0.01 (0.08) 
Appropriations -2.62 (0.27) *** -1.11 (0.25) *** -0.60 (0.27) * 3.93 (0.27) *** 
Budget -2.03 (0.28) *** -2.38 (0.27) *** -1.23 (0.27) *** 0.07 (0.24) 
House Administration -0.14 (0.25) -0.12 (0.21) - - 
House Rules 2.95 (0.31) *** -1.69 (0.28) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - 1.64 (0.32) *** 0.68 (0.23) ** 
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Table 4-1 (continued).     
     
Constant 2.60 (2.70) -4.67 (2.32) * -10.53 (2.35) *** 1.25 (2.11) 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.48 0.44 0.31 0.32 
Note: Each column represents a time series cross-section beta regression model. Alternative models with counts as the dependent variables do not yield 
substantively different results. 
 p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
 
As chapter 1 showed, documenting the shift away from legislation and towards oversight is critical to understanding 
changers in congressional policymaking since the 1980s. Thus far I have discussed only what might affect the legislative side of 
the committee ledger: incentives for and uncertainty about whether legislation will reach the floor and cement a committee’s 
policymaking authority. The next chapter takes up the oversight side of the equation. Specifically, in addition to shifts in 
legislative authority, committees have responded to a demand for oversight from both developments in the executive branch 
after World War II and the legislative branch’s own actions, or rather inactions
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Chapter 5: Demand for Committee Oversight 
Congressional committees are spending less time on legislation and more time 
overseeing executive branch activity making policy through oversight. The previous two 
chapters have considered whether this shift is the result of increased uncertainty and 
changes in committee incentives to legislate. The evidence in chapter 4 specifically points 
to shifts in legislative authority resulting from rules changes in the House and Senate. As 
the party leaders have centralized agenda setting in both chambers, the committees have 
responded by shifting their focus to oversight. 
Congressional debate over “net neutrality” rules for internet usage highlight the 
tradeoff committees face when deciding whether to make policy through legislative or non-
legislative means. Net neutrality is the idea that all types of data available on the internet 
should be treated equally and so internet service providers (ISPs) should not charge users 
based on the type of data they access and download such as streaming video nor limit 
download and upload speeds for some streaming and file sharing services (and charge 
content providers for faster speeds). Such practices were not regulated until the Obama 
administration. The Federal Communications Commission in 2014 proposed a draft rule 
that would allow ISPs to create “fast lanes” and “slow lanes” for broadband access (Wyatt 
2014). The following year, following President Obama’s recommendation, the FCC 
reversed course and reclassified broadband internet as a “common carrier” 
telecommunication service—that is, as a public utility—thereby fostering net neutrality. 
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Republicans largely opposed the FCC’s move, and in 2017, following President 
Trump’s election and thus unified control of Congress and the White House, congressional 
Republicans have debated exactly how they should try to reverse the FCC’s ruling. 
Senators John Thune (R-S.D.). who chairs the Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Committee, and Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), who chairs that committee’s Communications, 
Technology, Innovation and the Internet Subcommittee, have introduced legislation that 
would allow Congress to limit the FCC’s authority to regulate broadband internet access. 
Others, such as House Republican Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.), who chairs the Energy 
and Commerce Communications and Technology Subcommittee, want the newly 
Republican-led FCC to change their net neutrality decision through rulemaking (Breland 
2017).  
Blackburn’s preferred strategy is only possible because the FCC was active in 
issuing telecommunications and, even more fundamentally, because we have an FCC at 
all. The federal government grew dramatically in both size and scope following World War 
II, which some scholars have argued created demand for greater congressional oversight. 
In this chapter I examine whether the committee shifts towards non-legislative 
policymaking documented in this dissertation result not only from fewer incentives to 
legislative, as shown in chapter 4, but from more incentives to conduct oversight. The first 
section discusses the explosion in federal government activity from the late 1940s through 
the early 1980s as one potential source of oversight demand. The second section discusses 
another potential source of demand: Congress itself. The section describes how 
breakdowns in the federal budget process intensify committee competition to define 
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executive branch agency attention and thus policymaking authority, which creates more 
incentives for committees to make policy through oversight. I then test my hypotheses 
about oversight demand empirically and discuss the substantive effects. I ultimately find 
limited support for oversight demand driving committee shifts in activity, and the chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion of why increased demand for oversight has not 
corresponded with greater supply. 
GROWTH IN GOVERNMENT 
 In The Politics of Information (2015), Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones describe 
what they call the Great New-Issue Expansion. The U.S. government became both thicker, 
more involved in the issues to which it already devoted attention, and broader, involved in 
a greater number of issues, in the decades following World War II. This expansion peaked 
in the late 1970s, and was followed by a contraction in some areas.  
Spending levels (outlays) help illustrate just how much the federal government 
continues to grow in both size and scope. Former Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen 
(R-Ill.) often is credited with saying, “a billion here, a billion there, pretty soon you’re 
talking real money” (Dirksen Center 2004). While that statement may be apocryphal, 
federal budget outlays have grown by hundreds of billions of dollars and into the trillions 
over the past 35 years, from just over one trillion dollars spent over the 1979-1980 congress 
to more than seven trillion dollars combined in 2011 and 2012 (see figure 5-1, see panel 
A). Bureaucratic rulemaking, measured through the number of pages published in the 
Federal Register, increased from around 100,000 pages published in 1985 and 1986 to over 
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150,000 pages in 1999 and 2000, and has held relatively steadily over the past decade and 
a half (see figure 5-1, panel B).11 
Figure 5-1. Growth in Federal Executive Branch Size and Scope 
Panel A: Budget Outlays 
 
 
Panel B: Bureaucratic Rulemaking 
 
Source: Vital Statistics on Congress, calculated by the author 
                                                 
11 The Federal Register is “the daily journal of the United States government” that publishes agency 
notices and proposed and final rules (http://www.federalregister.gov) 
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As executive branch activity grew, so did public skepticism of government-driven 
solutions to policy problems along with the number of interest groups lobbying for 
government attention (Aberbach and Rockman 1988; Baumgartner and Jones 2015; Gais, 
et al. 1984). A larger interest group environment helps members of Congress monitor 
bureaucratic policymaking by raising attention to issues their constituents care about 
(Aberbach and Rockman 1978; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), and a larger bureaucracy 
provides committees and their members with more opportunities to claim credit for benefits 
conferred on their constituents (Fiorina 1977).  
Congressional oversight scholar Joel Aberbach (1990, 201) states that, “Congress 
responds to changes in its environment. When there are changes in the relative payoffs of 
different types of behavior, and when resources change, Congress reacts.” According to 
this view, then, the political system’s changing needs have made oversight more attractive 
for satisfying legislator goals, and thus produced the shift in congressional committee 
activity towards non-legislative action seen chapter 2 (Ogul and Rockman 1990).  
Growth in Government Hypothesis: Committees will conduct less 
legislative activity when the executive branch is larger and more active in 
making policy. 
 
CRS, BUREAUCRATIC UNCERTAINTY, AND COMMITTEE COMPETITION 
 Committees can have several different purposes in mind when they oversee agency 
policymaking. Oversight is often thought of as directing agencies to do something, to carry 
out policy in a particular way (Aberbach and Rockman 1988; Epstein and O’Halloran 1994; 
McCubbins 1985; Moe 1987; Weingast 1984). Oversight carries a second aspect as well: 
getting agencies to pay attention to particular issues (Workman, et al. 2009; Workman 
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2015). As a freshman senator, Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) knew he would have difficulties 
advancing his legislative priorities. With a new Republican majority in the chamber, he 
was able to chair a Judiciary subcommittee where he held repeated oversight hearings in 
order to direct the Justice Department’s attention to his preferred issues of juvenile justice 
and recidivism and ultimately obtain bureaucrats’ agreement to work with him (Fenno 
1991). Agency attention and agenda capacity become more limited at the higher levels; 
with fewer positions towards the top of an organizational chart—without a division of 
labor—individual limits on attention become more salient (Hammond 1986; May, et al. 
2008). At the Department of Homeland Security, prioritizing terrorism and transportation 
security came at the expense of attention to disaster relief and recovery (May, et al 2008). 
Congressional committee jurisdictions become more complex as the American 
political system’s issue environment becomes more complex. Multiple committees and 
subcommittees in the same chamber might have jurisdiction over similar sets of issues; 
previous chapters have discussed how this overlap leads to competition for legislative 
authority. As committees try to grow their issue jurisdictions, they add the number of 
federal agencies and offices that fall within their purview. As multiple committees and 
subcommittees come to have a say over the same federal agency, they compete to define 
that agency’ priorities. 
 Committee competition to define agency priorities may be increasing as Congress 
increasingly fails to do so through annual spending bills. The typical congressional budget 
process involves the enactment of both authorization and appropriations bills, the former 
of which specifies which programs Congress authorizes the bureaucracy to carry out and 
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the latter of which funds those programs. Because Congress rarely completes all of its 
appropriations bills before the start of the fiscal year (CRS 2016), instead it must enact 
temporary, stopgap legislation called a continuing resolution. Continuing resolutions (CRs) 
specify a time period during which agencies receive the same level of (pro-rated) funding 
they received in the last fiscal period. Agencies are prohibited from creating new programs 
with the money they receive through a CR, though sometimes exceptions are made (CRS 
2016). The inability to create new programs is important because priorities change; policies 
change. An agency responsible for implementing a program may uncover new problems 
that require new solutions, but cannot adopt that solution. Former Homeland Security 
Secretary Jeh Johnson put it this way:  
When you’re on a continuing resolution, it is a little like trying to drive cross-
country with no more than five gallons of gas at a time and you don’t know 
when the next gas station is. You can’t plan. You can’t plan except days and 
weeks at a time. 
 
 Congress has increasingly relied on CRs in recent years as the two parties in 
Congress have been unable to agree on funding levels and as whichever party is in the 
majority has become wary of subjecting its members to “tough votes” that may hurt their 
re-election changes (Hawkings 2014; Marcos and Cox 2015; Sanchez 2014). Agencies 
spent most of the year governed by CRs in the late 1970s and early 1980s as Congress tried 
to navigate a changing budget process. The use of CRs dropped dramatically in 1989, from 
over 700 days under a CR in the previous congress to fewer than 100 days. Aside from the 
federal government shutdowns in the mid-1990s, agencies had to deal with relatively few 
CRs for a decade. Beginning in the 2000s, the number of agencies funded by CRs has 
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increased, first steadily and then dramatically during Barack Obama’s presidency (see 
figure 5-2). 
Figure 5-2. Number of Days Spent Under Stopgap Budgeting 
 
 
Source: Congressional Research Service 2016, calculated by the author. The number of days spent under a 
CR in a given congress is calculated based on the fiscal year, and so may be greater than the number of days 
in two calendar years (each two-year congress includes all or part of three fiscal years). 
 
Writing in CQ Weekly, reporter Kerry Young (2012, 2130) explains, 
“Appropriations bills are the accumulation of thousands of individual items... It's the 
purpose behind these line items that often is cast aside when Congress appropriates through 
a continuing resolution.” Absent congressional direction from appropriations bills, 
agencies must seek it from the committees that oversee them. The lack of purpose over 
how to spend money appropriated by CRs opens the door for committees to compete with 
one another to give agencies their purpose. By fostering uncertainty among agencies about 
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congressional policy priorities, Congress likely has fostered more competition among 
committees for agency attention—for decision-making authority within and across 
jurisdictions—rather than for legislative agenda space. 
Continuing Resolution Hypothesis: Committees will conduct less 
legislative activity when the federal government spends more time under 
continuing resolutions. 
 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
 Congressional committees have two options in making policy: though legislation 
or through some other non-legislative means, for which I have used oversight as an 
umbrella term. Whereas the previous chapter addressed shifts in legislative authority 
responsible for the decrease in committee legislative activity since the 1980s, this chapter 
considers the other side of the equation, specifically potential increases in the demand for 
committee oversight from a larger and more active executive branch and from Congress’s 
own reliance on short-term continuing resolutions that create uncertainty for agencies. I 
test the Growth in Government Hypothesis with two measures: the amount of federal 
budget outlays in a given congress, which measures the size and scope of executive branch 
activity, and the number of pages printed in the Federal Register over the course of a 
congress, which measures the level of bureaucratic activity. I test the Continuing 
Resolution Hypothesis with the number of days that the federal government spent funded 
by CRs in a given congress. All three of these measures are lagged by one congress. The 
models include the same dependent variables as in previous chapters, the multiple referral 
and cloture measures, the time trend counter, and the few committee fixed effects. Once 
again I discuss the results in terms of both statistical significance and substantive effects. 
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 The results provide only limited support for the idea that the shift in committee 
policymaking has been driven by an increase in demand for oversight. Of the two measures 
used to test the Growth in Government hypothesis, only the budget outlays coefficient 
estimates achieve accepted standards of statistical significance, and does so only in the 
Senate reported bills model (though the estimate is statistically significant at p < 0.06 in 
the House hearings model). The Federal Register pages measure approaches statistical 
significance at p < 0.10 in the House bills model. The number of days spent governed by 
continuing resolutions does not appear to have significantly affected committees’ shifts 
towards making policy through oversight in either the House or Senate (see table 5-1).12 
Many of the legislative authority coefficient estimates remain statistically significant when 
controlling for the growth in government activity and reliance on continuing resolutions, 
which speaks to the robustness of this explanation for the shift in committee activity away 
from legislation. 
                                                 
12 Using a measure of the total number of CRs enacted in the previous congress does not change the 
models’ substantive results. 
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Table 5-1. Growth in Government and Demand for Committee Oversight 
 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Growth in Govt.     
Federal Outlays (in 
$billions) 
-0.0004 (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0002) -0.001 (0.0002) *** 
Federal Register pages 
(in thousands) 
-0.001 (0.004) -0.005 (0.003) -0.005 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 
No. of days under CR in 
prev. Cong. 
0.0001 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0001 (0.0004) 0.0003 (0.0003) 
Leg. Authority     
Mult. Ref. × Post-1995 -0.01 (0.006) * -0.01 (0.01) - - 
Mult. Ref. Perc. 0.0001 (0.005) 0.01 (0.004) - - 
Post-1995 Indicator 0.14 (0.42) 0.67 (0.36) - - 
Cloture Motions -0.01 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) -0.01 (0.004) * -0.002 (0.004) 
Controls     
Time Trend 0.09 (0.08) -0.17 (0.07) * -0.15 (0.07) * 0.17 (0.06) ** 
Appropriations -2.63 (0.27) *** -1.15 (0.25) *** -0.56 (0.27) * 3.69 (0.27) *** 
Budget -2.08 (0.28) *** -2.34 (0.27) *** -1.35 (0.27) *** 0.15 (0.23) 
House Administration -0.15 (0.25) -0.13 (0.21) - - 
House Rules 2.94 (0.31) *** -1.67 (0.28) *** - - 
Senate Rules & Admin - - 1.59 (0.32) *** 0.67 (022) ** 
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Table 5-1 (continued).     
     
Constant 0.12 (0.53) -1.03 (0.45) * 0.78 (0.48) 0.69 (0.42) 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.47 0.44 0.27 0.37 
Note: Each column represents a time series cross-section beta regression model. Alternative models with counts as the dependent variables do not yield 
substantively different results. 




 While the federal outlays coefficient estimate is not consistently significant across 
the four models, its substantive effect is fairly large when it is significant. Holding all else 
constant, when the federal government spends about one trillion dollars over the course of 
a congressional term, as was the case in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the odds of a Senate 
committee marking up and reporting out one of the bills in its jurisdiction is already less 
than half. When federal budget outlays reach two trillion dollars, the odds of a Senate 
committee’s bill being reported to the floor drop to just 20 percent. By the time federal 
budget outlays reach 4 or 5 trillion dollars over a congress, as happened in the early 2000s, 
the odds of a Senate bill being reported out of committee drop to about two percent. With 
budget outlays clearing 7 trillion dollars in recent years, holding all else constant, the odds 
of a Senate bill being reported out of committee are virtually zero. (see figure 5-3). 
Figure 5-3. Effect of Increase in Federal Spending on Senate Markups 
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CAN CONGRESS MEET THE DEMAND FOR OVERSIGHT? 
 The federal government rapidly expanded after World War II, with the executive 
branch becoming more active on the issues in which it was already involved while also 
expanding its reach into new sets of issues. While the dramatic federal government growth 
would seem to create demand for congressional committees to spend more time overseeing 
agency activity, in this chapter I have found only limited support for such an explanation 
for the decline in committee legislative activity. Increased federal spending seems to 
influence whether Senate committees advance legislation in their jurisdiction, but the same 
cannot be said for how those committees’ hearing activity, nor for House committees. 
The results found here may speak to the linkages between legislative and non-
legislative policymaking (Foreman 1988). Legislation can be used to direct agency 
attention and activity (Aberbach 1990; Epstein and O’Halloran 1994). As seen in chapter 
2, committees on the whole are maintaining their levels of oversight conducted since the 
1980s, and it is their legislative activity, including that which provides direction to federal 
agencies, that has declined. The shift in committee policymaking away from legislation 
and towards other forms of non-legislative activity thus largely remains a story about 
shifting resources and incentives to compete for legislative authority in each chamber. 
Yet another possibility is that demand for oversight has grown but that 
congressional committees lack the capacity to meet such demand. Following World War 
II, Congress struggled to keep pace with an executive branch that was rapidly increasing 
its in-house policy expertise and technological capacity, and many scholars through the 
1960s, 1970, and 1980s cast doubts on the institution’s ability to adequately provide 
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oversight of agency policymaking (Dodd [1981] 2012; Dodd and Schott 1979; C. Jones 
1976; Shepsle and Weingast 1985; Sundquist 1981). Supply, to these authors, could not 
keep up with demand for oversight. Committees may have reached their oversight “ceiling” 
and are making non-legislative policy to the extent of their abilities.  
The concluding chapter situates the dissertation’s findings within a broader context 
and discusses their implications for Congress as a policymaking body, for citizen 
understandings and evaluations of the institutions, and for political scientists and 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The U.S. Congress has come under fire in recent years from the public, from 
journalists and political scientists, and from its own members. While the institution’s public 
standing has never been particularly robust (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995), the 
complaints of late center on the institution’s legislative productivity, or rather the lack 
thereof. Yet when examining the data in chapter 1, we find that the number of substantive 
laws has remained steady since the 1980s, dropping only very recently. Rather, the story 
of contemporary lawmaking is being told by the committee system. Congressional 
committees have curtailed much of their legislative activity such as learning about 
legislation through hearings and sending bills to the floor, and instead are spending 
relatively more time on overseeing executive branch policymaking and other non-
legislative activities. The shift in committee policymaking has resulted from two trends, 
both stemming from a greater centralization of agenda setting authority and responsibility 
within the congressional party leadership. First, committees face greater uncertainty about 
whether their bills will actually be considered and debated, particularly in the Senate. 
Second, committees have fewer incentives to compete with one another for the floor debate 
that does take place, along with the authority to control the parameters of that debate. After 
briefly reviewing the role that committees play in setting Congress’s agenda and the 
changes to committee policymaking over time, I discuss what this dissertation’s findings 
mean for Congress and for how political scientists and citizens think about the legislative 
branch of the United States government. 
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COMMITTEES AS CONGRESS’S AGENDA SETTING CAPACITY 
 Lawmaking requires agenda setting, and Congress's agenda setting capacity lies 
within its committee system. The committee system can simultaneously process multiple 
flows of information about problems and solutions at once and adapt to changes in those 
information flows, which expands Congress's plenary agenda (Adler and Wilkerson 2012; 
Cooper 1970; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Kingdon 1984; McConachie 1898). 
Committees act as Congress’s agenda setting capacity for both problems (what issues the 
institution should address) and solutions (how it should address those problems). They do 
so by processing and prioritizing the different substantive and political information vying 
for congressional attention, either through learning about and advancing legislation or by 
overseeing executive branch policymaking and engaging in similar forms of non-
legislative policymaking. 
Congressional committees today are holding relatively fewer legislative referral 
hearings in favor of conducting oversight and are sending relative fewer bills to the floor 
for consideration. To understand why, I posit that committees as organizations within 
Congress have two main goals: helping their individual members achieve their goals 
(whatever those might be), and gaining or retaining policymaking authority. This authority 
allows committees to decide for themselves which issues to address and how to address 
them. Making policy through either legislation or oversight incurs opportunity costs; time, 
attention, and other resources that cannot simultaneously be devoted to other activities. In 
order to offset these opportunity costs, committees pursue whichever policymaking 
activities will contribute to their authority and thus their goals. 
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 Agenda space and the attention to different issues and proposals such space 
provides is finite. Spending time debating one bill ensures that other legislation is left off 
the agenda (Adler and Wilkerson 2012). Committees thus must compete with each other 
for agenda space, both in holding hearings and in sending legislation to the floor for 
potential consideration. The decision to pursue policy through legislation or oversight is 
critical because doing so—in either case—imposes opportunity costs on committees (Bawn 
1997). Non-legislative action allows committees to better retain and expand their decision-
making authority but provides mostly minimal, short-term gains, while legislation can 
establish a committee’s decision-making authority for a longer period of time and provides 
more visible credit-claiming opportunities but also creates more uncertainty for committees 
as they directly compete with one another for limited floor space for their bills. 
Committees thus must balance trying to lock in policy authority through legislative 
effort with the uncertainty of whether a bill will be taken up on the floor and the opportunity 
costs of foregoing more certain, but more limited, non-legislative action. As they balance 
their legislative and non-legislative work, committees must anticipate both other panels' 
decisions about how they make policy and the party leaders' decisions about what the larger 
institution will prioritize. Legislating has become a less attractive prospect for committees. 
The main source of this decline is the centralization of different agenda setting procedures 
under party in both the House and Senate, which in turn alter the contours and availability 
of legislative authority for committees. Additionally, the executive branch has grown in 
size and scope since World War II, which ensures a steady demand for congressional 
attention to agency activity. As legislative authority has shifted and agencies seek answers 
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for how to set priorities among their many programs, committees are finding it more 
fruitful—or at least more likely of offsetting their opportunity costs—to use their hearings 
to define issues and compete for bureaucratic attention. 
As Figures 2-1 and 2-2 show, committee choices to make policy through legislative 
or non-legislative means influences Congress’s issue agenda. Committees with jurisdiction 
over legal and constitutional issues and the environment have taken on larger legislative 
roles since the 1980s, while agriculture policy, small business issues, homeland security, 
and foreign relations are more likely to be conducted through oversight. How committees 
allocate their policymaking activity thus shapes the politics of Congress’s voting agenda 
and the issues that the public sees the institution addressing. 
While oversight has come to be an important congressional responsibility, 
discontents over the institution’s processes and outputs lay bare the reality that citizens, 
journalists, political scientists, and members of Congress themselves still expect much of 
its work to still be legislative. Congress is, after all, the legislative branch of the federal 
government. What does the shift in committees away from legislating, even as the 
institution as a whole still engages in substantive lawmaking, mean for our understanding 
of Congress’s role as an agenda setter in the U.S. policy process and its capacity to fill that 
role? 
WHAT’S HAPPENING NOW? 
 This dissertation has analyzed committee activity through the 112th Congress 
(2011-2012), the most recent congress for which complete data exist as of this writing. 
Congress has undergone several changes to its rules and operations since 2012, including 
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several government shutdowns and even more continuing resolutions, the House Freedom 
Caucus’s emergence and eventual ouster of House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), a 
decision by Senate Democrats to change the chamber rules and prohibit filibusters on 
Cabinet and lower-level judicial nominations, a Senate Republican decision not to even 
hold hearings on President Obama’s third Supreme Court nominee, Merrick Garland, and 
congressional Republican uncertainty about whether and how to proceed in repealing all 
or parts of what remains of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
All of the above developments tie back to shifts in committee policymaking and 
Congress’s capacity to fulfill its role within the U.S. policy process. The high-profile 
obstruction of Obama nominees and the inability to enact appropriations bills on time both 
speak to how Congress’s issue agenda has become focused on a few high-profile matters 
as the two parties have become stronger and more contentious (Bendery 2015; Everett 
2015; Sherman and Bresnahan 2015). Such a narrow focus crowds out other issues that 
eventually pile up, which in turn sends signals to committees about the likelihood of their 
legislative efforts bearing fruit. Lowering the threshold for confirmation to a simple 
majority for executive branch and federal judicial nominees essentially eliminates the 
possibility of filibustering those nominees, which should free up some agenda space and 
allow the Senate more time to consider other issues. Yet the continued reliance on CRs and 
Republican acceptance of government shutdowns as a legitimate negotiating position will 
ensure that budgets and spending issues will take up a large portion of Congress’s time and 
attention and leave other issues unaddressed. While the analysis of chapter 5 did not find 
strong evidence for the reliance on continuing resolutions driving committee oversight, 
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more work could be done to identify whether and how budgetary uncertainty affects 
subsystem policymaking, signaling between the executive and legislative branches, and 
competition for bureaucratic attention and prioritization. 
The House Freedom Caucus’s displeasure with former Speaker Boehner and 
congressional Republicans’ more recent indecision about repealing and/or replacing the 
Affordable Care Act further point to growing restlessness with how contemporary party 
leaders are using the tools at their disposal (provided to them by strong, cohesive party 
membership) to shape legislative the legislative agenda by controlling committee 
assignments, restricting amendments, and keeping some measures off of the schedule 
entirely (Bade and Schneider 2016; Dennis and Kapur 2017; Ferrechio 2016). As party 
leaders have gained more decision-making authority and committees have found 
themselves with fewer legislative incentives, committee capacity to legislate likely has 
decreased. Over time, as committees repeatedly make policy through oversight or other 
non-legislative means and members are replaced by new colleagues, the institutional 
memory of what stakeholders need to be involved in reauthorizing policy and how to write 
a bill that can pass gradually disappears. If members of Congress decide to shift authority 
back to committees, they may have to re-learn how committee-driven lawmaking works. 
In 2017, a unified Republican Congress under a Republican president also has 
repealed several Obama-era agency regulations through the legislative process, specifically 
under the authority of the Congressional Review Act (CRA), including environmental and 
labor rules. This legislative approach to directing agency activity is consistent with the 
choice between making policy legislatively or through non-legislative means, yet stands in 
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contrast to influencing rulemaking through oversight hearings, as with the regulation of 
commercial drones (Bump 2014), and “retrospective oversight” where committees work 
with agencies to overturn the previous administration’s actions (MacDonald and McGrath 
2016). The issues on which Congress uses the CRA to repeal regulations compared to 
letting committees guide (or reverse) rulemaking through oversight may depend on the 
level of discretion Congress has delegated to agencies and is worth studying in more detail. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS AS POLICYMAKING BODY 
Party leaders today exert more authority over Congress’s legislative outputs by 
finding alternate pathways for legislation to come to the floor, setting the terms of debate 
to ensure party victories, and in some cases even authoring major legislation themselves 
(Aldrich and Rohde 2010; Sinclair 2007). Congressional scholar Barbara Sinclair (2007) 
argues that many of these changes, including the House multiple referral and “primary” 
referral rules and party leader control over Senate debate discussed in chapter 4, were 
instituted in order to facilitate lawmaking. Adopting a large continuing appropriations 
resolution may be easier than passing a dozen contentious appropriations bills, and 
designating a committee of primary referral may discourage committee gatekeeping, but 
doing so provides committees with fewer incentives to compete with one another for 
legislative authority. The “unorthodox” procedures put in place to make it easier to pass 
legislation have made it less likely that legislative agenda setting takes place; in bypassing 
committees, Congress has encouraged them to make policy on their own.  
Consider how these related trends affect a member of Congress in who is not part 
of the leadership team and does not sit on a committee that deals with tax policy, but who 
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nonetheless cares about the United States tax structure and how tax policy is made. Debate 
on any tax bill that comes to the chamber floor today likely will be restricted either in the 
amount of time allowed or on the amendments that can be offered (Sinclair 2007), meaning 
our member cannot try to change the committee’s bill; she can simply vote yea or nay. And 
without a seat on any committee with jurisdiction over taxes, she cannot direct agency 
implementation or highlight the specific issues in taxation she thinks deserve attention. 
Contemporary congressional policymaking is thus stratified, with legislative policy being 
set at the leadership level, non-legislative policy being made at the committee and 
subsystem level in communication with bureaucrats, interest groups, and other interested 
actors, and rank-and-file members who do not serve on a particular committee—along with 
the constituents these members represent—left without a voice in shaping Congress’s 
policy agenda. 
Committee competition for information, agenda space, decision-making authority 
drives congressional agenda setting and thus the institution’s role in the policy process. 
Congress’s policy agenda and the rules governing the committee system as it existed in the 
late 1970s, through the 1980s and into the early 1990s gave rise to a “jurisdictional 
battlefield” as committees competed with one another for legislative authority 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Such competition is important for several related reasons. 
First, committees often are biased towards certain issue definitions and prioritize 
certain kinds of information and information sources within the policy process (Jones, et 
al. 1993). Keeping policy and decision-making authority within one committee ensures 
that elites within that issue’s subsystem will control policy outcomes and exercise 
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gatekeeping over proposals and issue definitions that would reduce their authority 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Competition among committees to define policy issues and 
thus gain (or retain) decision-making authority mobilizes different interests and can help 
overcome one committee’s bias, thereby helping pluralism flourish within Congress and a 
greater diversity of interests to be represented. 
Second, Schick (1976, 232) argues that, “the demand for and use of [policy] 
analysis is a function of the openness of the legislative process to a multiplicity of interests 
and participants.” Committee competition and the multiple, pluralistic policy venues such 
competition creates on any given issue thus encourage the use of expertise and analysis to 
inform debate and develop solutions. Other kinds of political information such as 
constituent preferences and the structure of different coalitions within Congress 
undoubtedly are important when developing policy. Yet hearing from policy experts and 
analysts when defining problems and devising solutions can help ensure that Congress and 
the rest of the political system actually fix the problems they are trying to address. Third, 
subsystem control over issue definitions typically leads to small, incremental adjustments 
to policy (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). By providing alternate venues for entrepreneurs 
and other looking to redefine issues and present new solutions, a competitive committee 
system helps create the conditions for Congress to enact major policy changes 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
The two changes to legislative authority that were discussed in chapter 4—a House 
rules change designating a primary committee for bills referred to multiple panels and the 
rise in (leadership-driven) cloture efforts to fight filibusters—each have disincentivized 
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committee legislative activity and competition, and in so doing have affected Congress as 
a policymaking institution. As Congress spends more and more of its scarce floor time 
debating budgeting and spending issues and, in the Senate, executive and judicial 
nominations, less time is available for other issues like agriculture, education, health care, 
energy, and cybersecurity. As fewer of these bills are taken up, committees find fewer 
reasons to pursue legislation at all, and so Congress’s policy agenda—the issues to which 
it pays attention to—changes in ways that may not match the needs of those implementing 
policy every day. Designating a committee of primary referral, meanwhile, establishes 
lines of legislative authority from the outset and so provides fewer incentives for committee 
competition and thus fewer chances to foster expertise on new and emerging issues that 
may cut across jurisdictions (King 1997). 
Congress’s capacity to cope with the changing policy environment in which it exists 
is often met through decentralization (Polsby 1971). Centralizing agenda setting and giving 
party leaders more authority does not take advantage of the institution’s division of labor 
and make its agenda subject to greater individual limits on attention without the 
institutional mechanisms to compensate for those limits. How, then, should we as citizens 
evaluate our Congress? 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HOW CITIZENS THINK ABOUT CONGRESS 
Congress has a fundamental agenda setting role in the U.S. policy process, where 
agenda setting is broadly defined as processing and prioritizing information for action 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Yet a tradeoff exists between Congress’s information 
processing and its prioritization, between its ability to deliberate and its ability to quickly 
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and decisively address policy problems (McConachie 1898). A decentralized Congress 
with a strong committee system that fosters attention to and deliberation of a wide array of 
policy problems but may struggle to put together a comprehensive solution and a more 
centralized Congress with strong party leaders that present a coherent agenda but do so in 
a way that leaves other elected representatives out of the loop and lacks the capacity to 
address changing issue environments. Given this tradeoff, what should we expect out of 
congressional parties and party leaders and, ultimately, out of Congress? 
In an era of strong, polarized parties, party leaders are given the tools to facilitate 
action, to work towards cohesive party agendas that they can present to voters (Aldrich and 
Rohde 2010; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Sinclair 2007). Doing so requires prioritizing 
those issues that a party thinks will help it win elections and maintain a cohesive identity. 
Prioritization is just that: paying attention to some issues and some proposals, while not 
paying attention to others. When citizens decide we want stronger parties representing us 
in Congress, with party leaders given the tools to offer clear priorities and take decisive 
action, then we devalue Congress’s information processing function. When we decide that 
the parties have become too strong, too combative, and that the institution’s agenda 
neglects too many issues vying for attention; and we support a more decentralized Congress 
with rules and structures that encourage members to develop expertise and the 
incorporation of a wider range of information and analysis, both policy-related and 
political, then we need to be more patient regarding the institution’s ability to act quickly 
and comprehensively. 
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I offer this tradeoff not to say that one choice or the other is correct. Different 
citizens will have different preferences. But thinking of Congress in terms of its agenda 
setting role introduces different expectations for how the institution should operate and 
offers a new perspective by which to evaluate the institution and whether Congress is 
fulfilling its role within the policy process. And all is not hopeless; oversight and other 
non-legislative work also has value, particularly for signaling to us that members of 
Congress are listening and paying attention to the same issues we care about (Sulkin 2005). 
Citizens thus should be more aware of and engage in congressional policymaking earlier 
in the process than when members vote on final passage of a bill as another way to ensure 
that Congress maintains its pluralistic character. 
How realistic is it to expect citizens to pay attention to congressional procedure or 
committee activity with less visibility than major legislation? The answer lies in part with 
how political scientists, journalists, and other commentators talk about Congress.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR HOW SCHOLARS AND COMMENTATORS THINK ABOUT CONGRESS 
 My dissertation’s findings have two important implications for how political 
scientists, journalists, and other commentators study and talk about Congress, one narrower 
and one broader. The narrower concern centers on how we view committee power. The 
literatures on Congress and the policy process suggest committees are powerful in two 
(non-exclusive) circumstances. First, when bill that gets enacted into law looks similar to 
the bill a committee sent to the floor. The final product can be similar to the proposal either 
because no one else was able to amend the committee’s proposal or because the committee 
was given a privileged position when resolving inter-cameral differences (Krehbiel, et al. 
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1987). Second, when committees can make more policy through oversight without needing 
even to send a bill to the floor (Bawn 1996; Khademian 1995). 
Both conditions for committee power are present in the contemporary Congress. 
As this dissertation has shown, committees are spending more and more of their time 
making policy through oversight. And Sinclair (2007) and others have previously shown 
that fewer and fewer proposed amendments are being allowed on legislation that does get 
debated on the floor. Yet one would be hard-pressed to find a journalist or Congress scholar 
willing to say with a straight face that committees today are more powerful than they were 
50 years ago, particularly when even a committee considered one of the most powerful, 
Senate Appropriations, struggles to find a senator willing to act as chair (Sanchez 2012). 
We as scholars need to either start talking about a Congress of both powerful parties and 
committees or re-orient our theories of committee power to de-emphasize the importance 
of debate rules and amendments and emphasize how hard it is to get a proposal scheduled 
for debate at all. 
The broader point for scholars and commentators is related, that of the need to focus 
more on policymaking within committees and what committees are doing in a party-driven 
era. Given that more committee activity today is non-legislative, what does that activity 
look like? Are committees organizing themselves in ways that reflect the crowded 
legislative environment? How involved are party leaders in driving oversight activity and 
the issues on which committees engage the bureaucracy? Scholars in the 1970s and 1980s 
lamented a decentralized Congress’s inability to conduct what they saw as effective 
oversight (Dodd [1981] 2012; Dodd and Schott 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1985), while 
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today we hear encomiums to that era and a desire to return to an age when Congress could 
conduct good oversight (Zeller 2014). What exactly is “good” oversight, and as a 
centralized, party-driven institution solved the problems that scholars identified 30 years 
ago? If not, what would it take for congressional oversight to improve? And as we saw in 
chapter 2, the two designated oversight committees are actually legislating more today than 
many other “legislative” committees.  
Finally, political scientists and members of Congress alike recently have lamented 
a polarized, dysfunctional Congress and suggested paths forward to encourage more 
deliberation and dealmaking. Many of these proposed solutions focus on altering election 
rules to encourage more moderate candidates to run and win office or in creating more 
incentives for bipartisan collegiality and cooperation in Washington (Mann and Ornstein 
2012; Mansbridge and Martin 2015). But as we saw in chapters 3 and 4, reducing 
partisanship alone will not reverse the shift away from committee legislating we have seen 
over the past 35 years; institutional rules need to change in order to incentivize and 
empower committees to invest time, and other resources into making legislative policy. A 
greater focus on committees and their place in the policy process may yield better 
descriptions of what has and has not changed in a party-driven Congress, which in turn will 
lead to more precise definitions of what problems may exist and thus recommendations 
that have a chance of changing the institution’s operations and capacity in ways that the 





This dissertation both describes and explains the decline in congressional 
committee legislative activity seen since the 1980s. In testing different explanations for 
this trend, I have used time series cross section beta regression models with two dependent 
variables: the proportion of hearings a committee holds in a given congress that are 
legislative, and the proportion of bills referred to a committee in a given congress that said 
committee marks up and reports out for possible consideration. In this appendix I explain 
several measurement and modeling decisions that led to the analyses presented in the 
preceding chapters. In the first section I explain why the dependent variables used in the 
statistical analyses are proportions rather than counts of legislative hearings. The second 
section discusses specific modeling choices made to account for both the cross-sectional 
and time-serial nature of the models used, namely the use of a time trend counter and a few 
specific committee fixed effects. The third section specifies alternate models. 
WHICH DEPENDENT VARIABLE? COUNTS VS. PROPORTIONS 
 In this dissertation, I state that committees have two choices when making policy, 
to legislate or to conduct oversight (which includes other forms of non-legislative 
policymaking), and I find that legislative activity among committees has become less and 
less common over time. When measuring a committee’s level of activity (legislative or 
otherwise), one can use a proportion, as I have done, or a count such as the number of 
legislative or oversight hearings and the number of bills a committee marks up and reports 
out. A count measure might be attractive for several reasons, foremost of which is its ease 
of interpretation, both in descriptive data and in interpreting statistical model results with 
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counts as the dependent variable. A proportion also may not capture when the overall 
number of hearings has declined (which indeed has happened, though as shown in chapter 
1 the decline has occurred largely due to the drop in legislative hearings), and thus may 
mask broader congressional trends. 
Yet this latter point is also what makes proportions more appropriate for this 
project. If one were to use counts as the dependent variable, then one would need to control 
for a particular committee’s total number of hearings held (or total number of referred bills) 
in order to account for differences in committee workload. A very active committee like 
House Energy and Commerce holding three fewer legislative hearings each congress is 
very different from a less-active committee like House Science and Technology holding 
three fewer legislative hearings each congress. A proportion, by its nature, takes these 
cross-committee differences into account and tells us, relative to a given committee’s 
regular activity, whether that activity is less or more legislative. 
In choosing proportions, one also could decide to calculate the proportion of 
hearings that are non-legislative and document that increase. As we saw in chapter 1, when 
hearings are divided into legislative and non-legislative categories the temporal decline is 
only among legislative hearings, while the overall level of non-legislative hearings has held 
relatively steadily (with some congress-to-congress variation). The story worth telling and 
explaining is really about the decline of legislative activity. Calculating the proportion of 
committee legislative activity helps tell this story while also considering cross-committee 
differences and broad trends. 
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 Another reason to use proportions is that committees really have a third choice: to 
not do anything. Indeed, negative agenda setting or gatekeeping is an important committee 
right and function within the U.S. Congress. That members of Congress are spending less 
time overall on policy-relevant activities and more time on party fundraising and 
messaging has been documented elsewhere (Leahy 2007; Master 2016) but lies slightly 
outside the scope of this dissertation as it concerns member-level rather than committee-
level behavior. As described below, the interpretation of coefficient estimates from beta 
regression models, which require a dependent variable bounded between 0 and 1 (like a 
proportion), helps account, even if obliquely, for a committee potentially choosing to do 
nothing. 
More About Beta Regression 
 The beta distribution describes continuous data restricted to the interval (0,1). The 
distribution has two parameters, α and β (or, as parameterized by King 1998, ρ and γ). The 
beta distribution can take different shapes depending on the values of these parameters, 
making it highly flexible. (King 1998; Paolino 2001; Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004). The 
beta distribution's probability density function is given by: 
f(y | α, β) =  [ Γ(α + β) / Γ(α)Γ(β)]yα-1(1-y)β-1 
 
0 < y < 1 where α > 0, β > 0 and Γ· is the gamma function. The mean and variance of the 
beta distribution are: 
E(Y) = α / α+β 
and 
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V(Y) =  αβ / (α+β)2(α+β+1) 
The beta distribution’s likelihood function is: 
 
L(y | α, β) = n∏i = 1[ Γ(α + β) / Γ(α)Γ(β)]y
α-1(1-y)β-1 
= [ Γ(α + β) / Γ(α)Γ(β)]n n∏i = 1 y
α-1 n∏i = 1(1-y)
β-1 
 
The log-likelihood function is thus: 
 
ln L =  n ln Γ(a+b) + (α – 1) nΣi =1 ln y + (β – 1)
 nΣi =1 ln (y – 1) – n ln Γα – n ln Γβ 
 
Parameter estimates normally would be obtained by maximizing this function, and 
taking derivatives with respect to α+β. However, attempting to do so here would be 
unwieldy, as no closed-form solution exists (Gnanadesikan, et al. 1967). A method of 
moments approach is used to estimate the parameters instead. If the sample mean is: 
Ῡ = 1/n nΣi =1Yi 
and the sample variance is: 
1/n - 1 nΣi =1(Yi – Ῡ)
2 
then the method of moments estimates for α and β are: 
α = Ῡ{[Ῡ(1 – Ῡ) / s2] – 1} 
 
β = (1 – Ῡ){[Ῡ(1 – Ῡ) / s2] – 1} 
 
 Beta regression coefficient estimates cannot be interpreted directly, as can those of 
an ordinary least squares model, and instead must be exponentiated. Doing so yields odds 
ratios that translate roughly to: when a thing happens, what are the odds that said thing is 
what we’re interested in? In the case of committee activity, exponentiating the coefficient 
estimate yields the interpretation of when committees hold a hearing (receive a bill), what 
are the odds that said hearing is legislative (the committee marks up and reports said bill)? 
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Such an interpretation helps address both differences in average committee activity levels 
(say Energy and Commerce vs. Science and Technology) and the possibility of an overall 
decline in activity, and in doing so reinforces the desirability of measuring committee 
activity through proportions. Having addressed the dependent variables used in this 
dissertation, I turn now to the independent variables that account for heterogeneity both 
across time and across units. 
TIME SERIES CROSS SECTION MODELS 
 The dependent variables of interest in this dissertation are the level of committee 
activity within a given congress, and thus take a time series cross section (TSCS) structure. 
TSCS data can exacerbate problems associated with both unit-level heterogeneity and 
serial correlation. This section describes and explains the steps taken in the dissertation to 
help alleviate these problems. 
Accounting for Committee Heterogeneity 
A simple TSCS model takes the form Yit = α + βXit + εit, where i represents an 
individual unit and t represents a point in time. One assumption of the simple TSCS model 
is that a single intercept, α, is constant for all units. If this assumption is not true within the 
data, the covariate effect estimates (β) can be biased. The traditional way to account for 
possible heterogeneity of intercepts is through unit fixed effects (up to N – 1 intercepts). 
Fixed effects (FEs) introduce their own complications: they render slowly- or rarely-
changing within-unit covariates difficult to estimate, take up additional degrees of freedom 
which can render maximum likelihood estimates inconsistent, and do not tell us anything 
 115 
substantive about the committee heterogeneity's sources (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 2001; 
Zorn 2001). 
Rather than include intercepts for all committees, I have pursued a middle ground 
and included FEs for four House committees and three Senate committees that have unique 
responsibilities within Congress. First, the Appropriations Committees which are 
responsible for 13 bills each fiscal year (and more recently, for the continuing resolutions 
adopted in the absence of appropriations bills). The House and Senate committees’ 
jurisdictions are broad, but their activity never strays far beyond the annual spending bills. 
Second, the Budget Committees whose activities are even more restricted to those dealing 
with the budget resolution and budget reconciliation. The Budget Committees’ 
jurisdictions have changed slightly since their creation in 1980, but their focus remains on 
the budget process with relatively few but complex outputs. The House Rules Committees 
is responsible for a few substantive areas such as campaign finance, but the bulk of its 
activity is devoted to creating debate rules for other committees’ legislation.13 The House 
Administration Committee oversees federal election administration and the day-to-day 
workings of the U.S. House as a workplace, including office and parking assignments (its 
chair is sometimes called “the mayor of Capitol Hill”). The Senate Rules & Administration 
combines the House Rules and House Administration Committees’ functions, minus 
crafting debate rules. Giving these committees their own intercepts provides some 
                                                 
13 The Rules Committee observations used as the dependent variables in this dissertation omit the debate 
rules the committee approves and only include its own legislation. 
 116 
substantive reasoning for any potential differences in their policymaking decisions without 
taking up too many degrees of freedom.  
Accounting for Time 
 TSCS models may further fail to account for any serial correlation in the data. Some 
approaches for remedying this problem include lagged dependent variables and 
“differencing the data,” (Anderson and Hsiao 1981; Beck 2001; Zorn 2001), though these 
techniques also have their drawbacks. A “differences” model, which involves subtracting 
the dependent and independent variables’ values at time t – 1 from the values at time t, 
would explain changes in a committee’s proportion of legislative activity from one 
congress to the next. While the change from one congress to the next may be worth 
explaining, the differences model assumes that all of the independent variables’ effects on 
the dependent variable occur in in the initial time period (DeBoef and Keele 2008). As for 
lagged dependent variables, Achen (2000) notes that they can overwhelm other substantive 
variables' effects without eliminating the serial correlation for which they are meant to 
account. 
Yet another possible strategy would be to include FEs for all or some congresses. 
As noted above, FEs themselves do not provide explanations for heterogeneity in the data, 
and to date no research has provided substantive reasons for specific congress-level fixed 
effects. Three possibilities come to mind: the 104th Congress (1995-6), which is taken into 
account through the interaction term discussed in chapter 4; the 105th and 106th 
Congresses (1997-2000), during which much congressional time and attention was focused 
on the Clinton impeachment; and the 107th Congress (2001-2), which included both the 
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September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and Vermont Sen. Jim Jeffords’ decision to leave the 
Republican Party and become an Independent who caucused with Democrats, which 
changed the upper chamber’s majority party five months into the first session. More 
research would need to be done on these specific congresses and their potential effects on 
the institution’s agenda to justify their inclusion as FEs here. 
I have again sought what I feel is a middle ground and included a time trend counter 
as an independent variable. The coefficient estimate on a time trend variable is interpreted 
as the overall direction (or trend) in which the dependent variable moves over time, rather 
than effects that may be specific to given years (or congresses). The time trend counter is 
appropriate for this dissertation’s analysis given that both the dependent variable and some 
of the independent variables (such as party polarization) exhibit temporal trends that should 
be accounted for. 
While I believe that the modeling decisions described in the previous two sections 
are sound, the next section specifies two sets of alternate models for the dissertation’s 
analysis: with counts as the dependent variable, and with lagged dependent variables 
(proportions) in lieu of a trend counter. As seen below, the alternate specifications largely 
do not change the dissertation’s substantive findings. Polarization and gridlock interval 
coefficient estimates are statistically significant and negative in their respective lagged 
dependent variable models, though as in chapter 4 these effects disappear in the models 
that include multiple referral and cloture motion measures. In the “growth in government” 
models, the Federal Register pages coefficient estimate becomes statistically significant in 
the House bills reported model when a lagged dependent variable is substituted for the 
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trend counter. Coefficient estimates for the multiple referral interaction term are 
statistically significant in the House bills reported model with counts rather than 
proportions as dependent variables show, while the cloture motion coefficient loses its 
statistical significance in the House models. 
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ALTERNATE MODELING APPROACHES 
Counts as Dependent Variables (Negative Binomial Regression Models) 
Table A-1. Pure Partisanship 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Divided Chambers -0.20 (0.10) -0.11 (0.12) -0.28 (0.15) -0.17 (0.14) 
Divided Branches 0.10 (0.11) 0.13 (0.13) 0.07 (0.13) 0.06 (0.13) 
Time Trend -0.08 (0.01) *** -0.01 (0.01) -0.16 (0.01) *** -0.11 (0.01) *** 
Appropriations -3.55 (0.35) *** -1.15 (0.24) *** -0.55 (0.25) * 3.96 (0.27) *** 
Budget -3.49 (0.35) *** -4.12 (0.37) *** -2.68 (0.34) *** 0.03 (0.24) 
House Administration -1.99 (0.24) -0.78 (0.24) ** - - 
House Rules -2.70 (0.26) *** -2.33 (0.26) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - -3.03 (0.37) *** 0.68 (0.23) ** 
     
Constant 3.87 (0.16) *** 3.87 (0.19) *** 4.14 (0.18) *** 4.46 (0.18) *** 
N 314 314 272 272 
AIC 2291 2818 1867 2600 
p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table A-2. Polarization 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Polarization -1.61 (1.93) -0.21 (2.24) -1.84 (3.49) -4.33 (3.38) 
Time Trend -0.02 (0.07) -0.002 (0.08) -0.12 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07) 
Appropriations -3.56 (0.36) *** -1.15 (0.24) *** -0.57 (0.25) * -0.66 (0.22) * 
Budget -3.48 (0.35) *** -4.13 (0.37) *** -2.68 (0.34) *** -1.54 (0.26) *** 
House Administration -1.99 (0.24) -0.78 (0.24) ** - - 
House Rules 2.41 (0.26) *** -2.33 (0.26) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - -3.02 (0.37) *** -0.41 (0.26) 
     
Constant 4.65 (0.95) *** 4.04 (1.10) 4.97 (1.82) ** 6.76 (1.77) *** 
N 314 314 272 272 
AIC 2293 2817 1870 2596 






Table A-3. Party Cartels 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Maj. Party-Floor Avg. 
Distance 
0.33 (0.56) -0.12 (0.64) 0.37 (0.36) 0.36 (0.35) 
Time Trend -0.08 (0.01) *** -0.01 (0.01) -0.16 (0.01) *** -0.07 (0.01) *** 
Appropriations -3.57 (0.36) *** -1.15 (0.24) *** -0.57 (0.25) * -0.66 (0.26) * 
Budget -3.49 (0.35) *** -4.13 (0.37) *** -2.69 (0.34) *** -1.56 (0.26) *** 
House Administration -1.98 (0.24) *** -0.78 (0.24) ** - - 
House Rules -2.41 (0.26) *** -2.33 (0.26) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - -3.03 (0.37) *** -0.41 (0.26) 
     
Constant 3.74 (0.24) *** 3.99 (0.28) *** 3.87 (0.20) *** 4.34 (0.20) *** 
N 314 314 272 272 
AIC 2294 2817 1869 2597 





Table A-4. Gridlock 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Gridlock Interval 1.11 (0.90) 0.24 (1.02) 1.64 (1.18) 0.26 (1.15) 
Time Trend -0.10 (0.01) *** -0.01 (0.02) -0.18 (0.02) *** -0.07 (0.02) *** 
Appropriations -3.57 (0.36) *** -1.16 (0.24) *** -0.59 (0.25) * -0.66 (0.26) * 
Budget -3.49 (0.35) *** -4.13 (0.37) *** -2.69 (0.34) *** -1.55 (0.26) *** 
House Administration -1.98 (0.24) *** -0.77 (0.24) ** - - 
House Rules -2.40 (0.26) *** -2.33 (0.26) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - -3.03 (0.37) *** -0.42 (0.26) 
     
Constant 3.52 (0.30) *** 3.86 (0.35) *** 3.49 (0.40) *** 4.41 (0.40) ** 
N 314 314 272 272 
AIC 2292 2817 1568 2598 






Table A-5. Legislative Authority 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Leg. Authority     
Mult. Ref. × Post-1995 -0.02 (0.006) ** -0.02 (0.01) * - - 
Mult. Ref. Perc. -0.001 (0.004) -0.002 (0.005) - - 
Post-1995 Indicator 0.58 (0.46) 0.68 (0.53) - - 
Cloture Motions -0.004 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.01 (0.004) ** -0.004 (0.004) 
Partisanship     
Divided Chambers -0.15 (0.13) -0.08 (0.16) -0.32 (0.14) * 0.08 (0.14) 
Polarization -0.20 (4.51) -0.89 (5.28) 7.91 (4.39) -2.81 (4.36) 
Controls     
Time Trend -0.06 (0.14) 0.02 (0.16) -0.26 (0.08) ** 0.10 (0.08) 
Appropriations -3.60 (0.35) *** -1.20 (0.24) *** -0.53 (0.25) * -0.66 (0.26) * 
Budget -3.24 (0.35) *** -3.83 (0.37) *** -2.72 (0.34) *** -1.56 (0.26) *** 
House Administration -1.99 (0.23) *** -0.71 (0.23) ** - - 
House Rules -2.05 (0.29) *** -1.98 (0.30) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - -3.02 (0.37) *** -0.41 (0.26) 
     
Constant 3.94 (2.24) 4.42 (2.62) 0.36 (2.23) 5.99 (2.21) 
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N 314 314 272 272 
AIC 2278 2813 1860 2599 
p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A-6. Growth in Government 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Growth in Govt.     
Federal Outlays (in 
$billions) 
-0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0003 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0001 (0.0002) 
Federal Register pages 
(in thousands) 
-0.005 (0.003) -0.002 (0.004) -0.003 (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) 
No. of days under CR 
in prev. Cong. 
0.0001 (0.0003) -0.00004 (0.0003) 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0005 (0.0003) 
Leg. Authority     
Mult. Ref. × Post-1995 -0.02 (0.006) ** -0.02 (0.01) ** - - 
Mult. Ref. Perc. -0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) - - 
Post-1995 Indicator 0.76 (0.36) 0.92 (0.41) - - 
Cloture Motions -0.006 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) -0.01 (0.004) * -0.01 (0.004) 
Controls     
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Table A-6 (continued).     
     
Time Trend -0.07 (0.07) -0.09 (0.08) -0.05 (0.01) * 0.003 (0.07) 
Appropriations -3.61 (0.35) *** -1.19 (0.24) *** -0.55 (0.25) * -0.65 (0.26) * 
Budget -3.24 (0.35) *** -3.86 (0.37) *** -2.69 (0.34) *** -1.57 (0.26) *** 
House Administration -1.99 (0.23) -0.70 (0.23) - - 
House Rules -2.05 (0.29) *** -2.02 (0.30) *** - - 
Senate Rules & Admin - - -3.01 (0.37) *** -0.41 (0.25) 
     
Constant 4.62 (0.45) 4.07 (0.53) *** 4.62 (0.49) *** 4.20 (0.46) *** 
N 314 314 272 272 
AIC 2279 2814 1867 2599 










Lagged Dependent Variable Included (D.V. is Proportion) 
Table A-7. Pure Partisanship 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Divided Chambers 0.01 (0.12) -0.19 (0.09) * 0.20 (0.16) -0.11 (0.11) 
Divided Branches 0.38 (0.13) ** 0.45 (0.09) *** 0.22 (0.14) 0.12 (0.10) 
Lagged D.V. 2.43 (0.32) *** 4.03 (0.37) *** 4.18 (0.37) *** 5.01 (0.29) *** 
Appropriations -1.76 (0.28) *** -1.30 (0.21) *** -0.39 (0.27) 0.95 (0.26) *** 
Budget -1.46 (0.28) *** -4.04 (0.26) *** -1.01 (0.27) *** 0.44 (0.20) * 
House Administration -0.81 (0.26) -0.17 (0.18) - - 
House Rules 3.01 (0.31) *** -1.43 (0.25) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - 1.70 (0.34) *** -0.21 (0.21) 
     
Constant -1.93 (0.13) *** -2.82 (0.10) *** -2.42 (0.16) *** -2.57 (0.12) *** 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.39 0.47 0.20 0.48 
p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table A-8. Polarization 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Polarization -2.53 (0.37) *** -0.97 (0.24) *** -4.48 (0.81) *** -1.97 (0.51) * 
Lagged D.V. 1.07 (0.035) ** 3.56 (0.38) *** 2.82 (0.41) *** 4.61 (0.29) *** 
Appropriations -2.13 (0.28) *** -1.21 (0.22) *** -0.46 (0.27) 1.24 (0.26) *** 
Budget -1.85 (0.28) *** -3.83 (0.26) *** -1.04 (0.27) *** -0.40 (0.20) 
House Administration -0.04 (0.26) -0.15 (0.18) - - 
House Rules 2.76 (0.31) *** -1.42 (0.25) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - 1.65 (0.34) *** -0.16 (0.20) 
     
Constant 0.68 (0.35) * -1.74 (0.21) 1.18 (0.62) -1.09 (0.37) *** 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.45 0.47 0.25 0.48 






Table A-9. Party Cartels 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Maj. Party-Floor Avg. 
Distance 
-0.39 (0.67) -0.26 (0.49) -0.05 (0.37) 0.50 (0.27) 
Lagged D.V. 2.60 (0.32) *** 3.85 (0.37) *** 4.32 (0.37) *** 4.96 (0.28) *** 
Appropriations -1.69 (0.28) *** -1.31 (0.22) *** -0.35 (0.27) 0.95 (0.26) *** 
Budget -1.45 (0.28) *** -3.78 (0.26) *** -0.96 (0.27) *** -0.43 (0.20) * 
House Administration -0.72 (0.27) -0.15 (0.21) - - 
House Rules 2.78 (0.31) *** -1.46 (0.25) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - 1.67 (0.34) *** -0.20 (0.21) 
     
Constant -1.54 (0.32) -2.42 (0.22) *** -2.25 (0.23) -2.78 (0.17) *** 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.38 0.46 0.20 0.47 





Table A-10. Gridlock 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Gridlock Interval -2.43 (0.71) *** -1.10 (0.49) * -0.72 (0.83) -1.32 (0.55) * 
Lagged D.V. 2.07 (0.34) *** 3.67 (0.38) *** 4.16 (0.40) 4.84 (0.29) *** 
Appropriations -1.80 (0.28) *** -1.24 (0.22) *** -0.36 (0.27) 1.11 (0.26) *** 
Budget -1.57 (0.28) *** -3.78 (0.26) *** -0.96 (0.27) *** -0.44 (0.20) * 
House Administration -0.56 (0.26) -0.14 (0.18) - - 
House Rules 2.66 (0.31) *** -1.45 (0.25) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - 1.65 (0.33) *** -0.19 (0.21) 
     
Constant -0.50 (0.37) -2.02 (0.24) *** -1.91 (0.43) *** -1.91 (0.27) *** 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.41 0.46 0.19 0.47 






Table A-11. Legislative Authority 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Leg. Authority     
Mult. Ref. × Post-1995 -0.01 (0.006) * -0.01 (0.005) - - 
Mult. Ref. Perc. -0.001 (0.005) 0.01 (0.004) ** - - 
Post-1995 Indicator 0.55 (0.39) 0.56 (0.30) - - 
Cloture Motions -0.01 (0.003) * -0.002 (0.003) -0.01 (0.004) ** -0.004 (0.003) 
Partisanship     
Divided Chambers -0.17 (0.12) -0.16 (0.09) -0.02 (0.14) -0.20 (0.10) 
Polarization -1.58 (1.02) -1.81 (0.76) * -0.68 (1.49) -1.06 (1.05) 
Controls     
Lagged D.V. 0.67 (0.34) * 3.84 (0.38) *** 2.94 (0.41) *** 4.65 (0.29) *** 
Appropriations -2.46 (0.28) *** -1.14 (0.21) *** -0.43 (0.27) 1.21 (0.26) *** 
Budget -1.88 (0.28) *** -3.72 (0.26) *** -0.99 (0.27) *** -0.40 (0.20) * 
House Administration -0.26 (0.25) -0.18 (0.18) - - 
House Rules 2.92 (0.35) *** -1.69 (0.27) *** - - 
Senate Rules & 
Administration 
- - 1.81 (0.34) *** -0.17 (0.20) 
     
Constant 0.66 (0.61) -1.53 (0.45) * -0.66 (0.86) *** -1.41 (0.57) 
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Table A-11 (continued).     
     
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.48 0.49 0.27 0.50 
p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A-12. Growth in Government 
 House Senate 
 Indep. Variables Leg. Hearings Reported Bills Leg. Hearings Reported Bills 
Growth in Govt.     
Federal Outlays (in 
$billions) 
-0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0003 (0.0001) *** 
Federal Register pages 
(in thousands) 
-0.002 (0.003) -0.01 (0.003) ** -0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.003) 
No. of days under CR in 
prev. Cong. 
0.00005 (0.0003) -0.00001 (0.0003) 0.0002 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0002) 
Leg. Authority     
Mult. Ref. × Post-1995 -0.01 (0.006) * -0.004 (0.005) - - 
Mult. Ref. Perc. 0.002 (0.005) 0.008 (0.004) * - - 
Post-1995 Indicator 0.32 (0.33) 0.39 (0.25) - - 
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Table A-12 (continued).     
     
Cloture Motions -0.01 (0.004) * -0.003 (0.003) -0.01 (0.004) * -0.001 (0.004) 
Controls     
Lagged D.V. 0.82 (0.34) * 3.96 (0.38) *** 2.63 (0.41) *** 0.98 (0.34) ** 
Appropriations -2.43 (0.28) *** -1.14 (0.21) *** -0.45 (0.27) 3.97 (0.27) *** 
Budget -1.88 (0.28) *** -3.60 (0.26) *** -1.06 (0.27) *** 0.19 (0.23) 
House Administration -0.28 (0.25) -1.93 (0.18) - - 
House Rules 3.01 (0.35) *** -1.65 (0.27) *** - - 
Senate Rules & Admin - - 1.73 (0.33) *** 0.56 (0.23) * 
     
Constant -0.05 (0.53) -1.49 (0.40) *** -0.36 (0.51) -1.10 (0.45) 
N 314 314 272 272 
Pseudo-R2 0.47 0.49 0.27 0.35 
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